Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History by Chamallas, Martha & Kerber, Linda K.
WOMEN, MOTHERS, AND THE LAW OF
FRIGHT: A HISTORYt
Martha Chamallas* with Linda K. Kerber**
The law of torts values physical security and property more highly
than emotional security and human relationships. This apparently
gender-neutral hierarchy of values has privileged men, as the tradi-
tional owners and managers of property, and has burdened women, to
whom the emotional work of maintaining human relationships has
commonly been assigned. The law has often failed to compensate wo-
men for recurring harms - serious though they may be in the lives of
women - for which there is no precise masculine analogue. This phe-
nomenon is evident in the history of tort law's treatment of fright-
based physical injuries, a type of claim historically brought more often
by female plaintiffs. There are two paradigm cases of fright-based
physical injury: the pregnant plaintiff who suffers a miscarriage or
stillbirth as a result of being frightened and the mother who suffers
nervous shock when she witnesses her child's injury or death. These
claims were classified in the law as emotional harms and a number of
special doctrinal obstacles were created to contain recovery in such
cases.
In the nineteenth century, tort claims for fright-based injuries were
governed by the contemporaneous physical impact rule. Under this
rule, a plaintiff could recover for a fright-based injury only if her
fright-based harm were coupled with a direct physical impact.1 Near
misses, regardless of the severity of the harm they caused, were not
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actionable. The demise of the impact rule in the 1930s provided a
greater opportunity for recovery for fright-based harms, including
fright-induced miscarriage or stillbirth. But only since 1968 and the
California Supreme Court's landmark decision in Dillon v. Legg
2 -
and only in some jurisdictions - has it been possible for a mother who
witnesses the negligent injuring of her child to recover for her own
fright-induced injuries.
Fright, of course, is not gender-specific. Men have suffered heart
attacks and other serious injuries from fright, arising both from con-
cern for themselves and for their loved ones. The relevant tort rules
have never been explicitly gender-based. Historically, however, wo-
men have tended to bring claims for fright-based injuries far more
often than for men.3
Until quite recently, courts and commentators indicated an aware-
ness of this gender disparity, although they lacked a feminist frame-
work in which to assess its significance in shaping the law. The
present state of legal scholarship, however, has lost sight of the
gendered aspect of fright law. The story now told by contemporary
treatises and casebooks no longer takes account of gender.
This article presents a gendered history of the law's treatment of
fright-based physical injuries. Our goal is to connect the law of fright
to the changing cultural and intellectual forces of the twentieth cen-
tury. Through a feminist lens, we reexamine the accounts of the legal
treatment of fright-based injuries offered by Victorian- era jurists, 4 tra-
ditionalist legal scholars of the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, 5 a legal realist in the 1930s, 6 and a Freudian medical-legal
commentator from the 1940s, 7 all of whom helped to shape present-
day tort doctrine. We conclude with an account of Dillon v. Legg,8 in
which the California Supreme Court recognized Margery Dillon's
right to recover for the harm she suffered from seeing her daughter
killed by a negligent driver.
This examination of the history of the law of fright shows that
gendered thinking has influenced the law, but has remained unexam-
ined. We make three basic observations. First, we claim that the legal
2. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
3. See infra notes 120, 148, and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 29-64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 124-58 and accompanying text.




categories of "physical" and "emotional" harm are not unrelated to
the gender of the victims. Women who have suffered fright-induced
physical injuries have been disadvantaged by the legal classification of
their injuries as emotional harm. Second, we demonstrate how the
legal system has placed women's fright-based injuries at the margins of
the law by describing women's suffering for the injury and death of
their unborn and born children as remote, unforeseeable, and unrea-
sonable. Finally, we raise the possibility that the claims of female
plaintiffs in these fright cases - plaintiffs such as Margery Dillon -
should be viewed as women's rights claims, as attempts to pressure the
legal system to recognize and value the interests of women. By con-
structing a gendered history of this legal claim, we aspire to reclaim
Dillon for women and to contribute to a feminist reconstruction of tort
law.
I. THE GENDERING OF HARM: EARLY LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF EMOTIONAL INJURY
An old English case, Lynch v. Knight,9 is famous for originating
the general proposition that mental disturbance alone does not qualify
as a legally cognizable harm. Lynch, decided in 1861, involved a claim
of defamation; Jane Knight charged that the defendant had turned her
husband against her by falsely accusing her of immorality. The court
dismissed her claim because the special damage Jane Knight alleged
- that her husband forced her to leave their home - was not, in the
court's view, a reasonably foreseeable response to the slander.
To the contemporary eye, the Lynch court's refusal to compensate
for emotional harm appears to apply equally to men and women.
However, there was a gendered dimension to the legal notion of
mental disturbance as it was used in Lynch. The opinions of the
judges in Lynch displayed a consciousness of gender difference and
used the dichotomy of physical and emotional harm to marginalize the
interests of women. The opinions demonstrated that categorization of
a legal harm is an active process: in a gendered world, injuries are
socially constructed so that the gender of the person claiming a loss
can affect the legal conceptualization of the harm. Additionally,
Lynch is valuable because it shows how gender differences can be
translated into gender disadvantage.
Lord Wensleydale's opinion in Lynch illustrates this process of
gender differentiation and disadvantage. He explained the common
9. IX H.L. Cas. 576, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
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law rule that permitted husbands, but not wives, to recover for loss of
spousal consortium:
[T]he benefit which the husband has in the consortium of the wife[] is of
a different character from that which the wife has in the consortium of
the husband. The relation of the husband to the wife is in most respects
entirely dissimilar from that of the master to the servant, yet in one re-
spect it has a similar character. The assistance of the wife in the conduct
of the household of the husband, and in the education of his children,
resembles the service of a hired domestic, tutor or governess; is of mate-
rial value, capable of being estimated in money; and the loss of it may
form the proper subject of an action, the amount of compensation vary-
ing with the position in society of the parties. This property is wanting
in none. It is to the protection of such material interests that the law
chiefly attends.
Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone ....
The loss of such service of the wife, the husband, who alone has all
the property of the married parties, may repair by hiring another ser-
vant; but the wife sustains only the loss of the comfort of her husband's
society and affectionate attention, which the law cannot estimate or rem-
edy. She does not lose her maintenance, which he is bound still to sup-
ply .... 10
Because Lord Wensleydale understood the wife's services as "mate-
rial," he found that the husband lost a pecuniary, compensable benefit
when his wife was injured through the negligence of another. In con-
trast, Wensleydale characterized the loss the wife sustained when her
husband was injured solely as "mental" and "emotional" and, accord-
ingly, denied her a cause of action.
The decision to classify the husband's loss as "material" was not
logically compelled, even though the husband was regarded as the
legal owner of the assets of the patriarchal family. It would have been
as defensible to regard the wife's services as nonpecuniary, given that
her work was unpaid and difficult to separate from her love and affec-
tion. 1 What is now regarded as an identical injury suffered by both
10. 11 Eng. Rep. at 863.
11. The court may have viewed its denial of compensation for emotional harm as gender-
neutral because technically neither spouse could recover for losses labeled as nonpecuniary. The
gendered nature of recovery, however, stemmed from the initial classification of the services
performed by each spouse. The husband's economic support of his wife was called pecuniary; the
wife's household services were likewise designated as pecuniary, despite their emotional dimen-
sion. Under common law, each of these services, of course, was legally owned by the husband
and the husband alone. The loss of each service was treated as a specifically male injury. The
wife was not regarded as the injured party when her husband's earning capacity was impaired.
The injuries the wife sustained, however, when her husband no longer was able to perform his
domestic role were called nonpecuniary. His day-to-day household involvement was not given a
pecuniary value, at least insofar as the loss of such activities was viewed as a loss to the wife. The
law not only limited compensation to pecuniary losses, it defined what would count as a "pecuni-
ary" loss in part by reference to the gender of the person seeking compensation.
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spouses - loss of spousal consortium - was then gender- differenti-
ated. When the husband was the plaintiff, the loss was viewed as ma-
terial harm; when the wife sought recovery, the loss was called
emotional harm. This legally constructed asymmetry resulted in gen-
der disadvantage to women.
A second Lynch opinion delegitimated women's harm by designat-
ing it as less tangible and more ephemeral than that experienced by
men. Lord Campbell's opinion sought to explain why the common
law allowed husbands but not wives to recover for the tort of criminal
conversation - the claim brought against a defendant for having sex-
ual intercourse with the plaintiff's spouse. While Campbell did not
believe that the husband's claim in these cases rested on the loss of
material services, he nevertheless viewed the harm as gender- distinct:
The wife is not the servant of the husband, and the action for criminal
conversation by the husband does not, like the action by a father for
seduction of a daughter, rest on any such fiction as a loss of the services
of the wife. The better opinion is that a wife could not maintain or join
in an action for criminal conversation against the paramour of her hus-
band who had seduced him. But I conceive that this rests on the consid-
eration that, by the adultery of the husband, the wife does not necessarily
lose the consortium of her husband; for she may, and, under certain cir-
cumstances, she ought to condone and still enjoy his society; whereas
condonation of conjugal infidelity is not permitted to the husband, and,
by reason of the injury of the seducer, the consortium with the wife is
necessarily for ever lost to the husband. 12
Campbell's view of the tortious consequences of adultery explicitly
incorporated a double standard of sexual morality. Adultery for men
was forgivable; the same conduct on the part of women was not.
Campbell analogized the husband's injury resulting from a wife's adul-
tery to the loss of property - a total deprivation that occurred regard-
less of the husband's subjective response. He relegated the wife's
injury to the noncompensable class of hurt feelings. Such an injury
was less permanent in nature and was viewed as largely dependent on
the wife's subjective response. By locating the wife's injury within her
own mind, the court could dismiss the harm and blame the victim for
not mitigating her own injuries. The court traced the wife's harm to
12. 11 Eng. Rep. at 859-60. Lord Campbell's argument should also be placed in the context
of English law, which regarded the husband as the head of the family and the representative of it
in its dealings with the world. Upon marriage, the woman lost her separate civil identity; it was
assumed that she had voluntarily forsworn the claim to make choices at odds with those of her
husband. In a powerful legal fiction, man and wife were understood to be one person; the mar-
ried woman was thefemme covert "covered" with her husband's legal identity for all practical
purposes. Accordingly, the wife would have difficulty claiming injury that the husband did not
also wish to recognize. See N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17-21 (1982).
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her own lack of compassion for her husband's transgression. The
court transformed the husband's hurt feelings, on the other hand, into
an objective harm. This subjective/objective dichotomy resembles the
gendered nature of the material/emotional dichotomy in the loss of
consortium: the harm to the woman is conceived of as subjective; the
same harm to the man is viewed as objective.
II. FRIGHT FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY - A SYNOPsIs
OF THE STANDARD LEGAL DOCTRINE
The process of gender differentiation and gender disadvantage also
exists in fright-based physical harm cases, although it is less visible
than in the common law doctrine of consortium or criminal conversa-
tion. Contemporary casebooks and most legal commentators tell a
degendered version of the legal doctrine.1 3 The standard account cen-
ters around three restrictive doctrines that have operated to limit re-
covery for fright-based injuries: the impact rule; the impact rule's
modem descendant, the physical injury rule; and the bystander rule.
The modem trend toward greater recovery has been accomplished by
rejecting or relaxing these restrictive doctrines. Today, the impact
rule has been discarded in virtually all jurisdictions and both the phys-
ical injury requirement and the bystander rule have been rejected in a
significant number of states.
14
The first doctrine - the impact rule - held that a plaintiff could
not recover for any fright-based injury (whether classified as mental or
physical) unless the plaintiff could point to some physical impact upon
her person. Thus, for example, the impact rule would insulate from
liability the defendant who was fortunate enough not to hit the plain-
tiff but whose negligent "near miss" caused the plaintiff to suffer ner-
vous shock and a resulting miscarriage.
A common justification for the impact rule treated it as a corollary
of the more general legal principle that limited recovery to material, as
opposed to emotional, harms. The rule allowed courts to indulge in
the fiction that an injury traceable to fright was only "parasitic" to
damage stemming from physical impact; thus, the law was not really
13. See, ag., R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
1049-83 (4th ed. 1984); 3 M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 284-320 (4th ed. 1987); F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF
TORT § 18.4, at 681-705 (2d ed. 1986); J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS
562-80 (2d ed. 1981); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 361-67 (5th ed. 1984); R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 603-10 (1982); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 392-409 (8th ed. 1988).
14. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 13, § 54, at 364-67.
February 1990]
Michigan Law Review
affording recovery for mental distress in its own right. This fiction was
important doctrinally because such parasitic damage, even of the
mental distress variety, was recoverable under well-established law.15
For example, a plaintiff who suffered traumatic bodily harm as the
result of a physical impact could also recover for pain and suffering,
despite the fact that pain and suffering might be regarded as a kind of
emotional harm. This rationale for the impact rule, however, was
completely undercut by cases where the physical impact was slight
and it was clear that it was fright which produced the plaintiffs' inju-
ries. Nevertheless, many American courts clung to the impact rule,
allowing recoveries even where plaintiffs had experienced only very
slight physical impacts.
16
Oliver Wendell Holmes may have revitalized the impact rule by
providing a new rationale "based upon a notion of what is practica-
ble." 17 In a prominent case at the turn of the century, Justice Holmes
found that the reason for the impact rule was to separate genuine from
fraudulent claims, not to separate the physical from the mental. The
requirement of an impact was said to function as some guarantee of
genuineness. By shifting the rationale from the theoretical to the prac-
tical, Justice Holmes helped the impact rule to survive in a significant
minority of the states until the 1960s.
The physical injury requirement is the modem descendant of the
impact rule. It requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that her fright re-
sulted in physical injury, rather than only mental distress.18 Like the
impact rule, the physical injury rule requires visible or tangible proof
of injury, but focuses on the injury itself, rather than on the manner in
which the injury is brought about. Like its predecessor, the rule is said
to guard against fraudulent claims, to limit recovery to serious inju-
ries, and to discourage plaintiffs who suffer only transient harm from
filing suit. Most jurisdictions have retained the requirement; only a
15. See id. at 362-63 (courts allow compensation for purely mental elements where defend-
ant's negligence inflicts immediate physical injury); 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIA-
BILITY 470 (1906); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REv. 1033, 1048-49 (1936).
16. See, eg., Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23
S.W.2d 272 (1929) (trifling burn); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860
(1906) (dust in eye); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (1961) ("any
degree of physical impact, however slight," even jostling during car accident); see also STATE OF
NEW YORK, LAW REVISION COMMISSION, ACT, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING
TO LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM FRIGHT OR SHOCK 49-61 (1936) (critiquing logic
of slight impact requirement).
17. Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N.E. 737, 737 (1902).
18. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 13, § 54, at 364-65.
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minority of states, most notably California, have eliminated it.19
These more liberal states allow recovery for negligent infliction of seri-
ous mental distress, even if unaccompanied by physical manifestations
or illness.
20
The third limitation on recovery - the bystander rule - emerged
as a principal impediment to recovery in a significant class of fright
cases only after the impact rule had been repudiated. 21 The bystander
rule requires a plaintiff to prove that her injury is traceable to fear for
her own personal safety, rather than fear or concern for the safety of
another. This restriction gets its name because it prohibits witnesses
to accidents from seeking recovery, thus limiting claims to primary
accident victims. Many jurisdictions that were unable to tolerate the
harsh results of the bystander rule have softened the rule to allow re-
covery to a plaintiff who feared for the safety of another person, if he
or she were also physically imperiled by the defendant's conduct. The
modified amended rule in these states became known as the "danger
zone" rule - placing the emphasis on the physical location of the
plaintiff rather than on the source of the mental distress.
The bystander or danger zone rules sometimes operated to prohibit
relief in unusually shocking circumstances. One court, for example,
applied the bystander rule to deny recovery to a mother of a newborn
who witnessed a nurse negligently drop her baby onto the tiled floor of
a hospital room, fracturing the baby's skull.22 Like the miscarriage
cases, however, the bystander cases more often involved transporta-
tion-related injuries; typically, the plaintiff witnessed an automobile
driver injure or kill a close family member.
23
The tide against recovery turned in California with the now-cele-
brated case of Dillon v. Legg,24 decided in 1968. Dillon was a "typi-
cal" case in which a mother witnessed her child being run down by a
negligent driver. The California Supreme Court rejected the stock ar-
guments against bystander recovery and refused to treat the mother of
19. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980) (allowing cause of action for serious mental distress not resulting in bodily injury).
20. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 171, 472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970) (courts are competent to
administer claims of mental distress raised as independent grounds for recovery); Chappetta v.
Bowman Transp., 415 So.2d 1019, 1022 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (no reason to distinguish between
physical and independent emotional injuries); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo.
1983) (allowing recovery for anxiety attack brought on when plaintiff was stuck in elevator).
21. See, eg., Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 47, 319 P.2d 80, 82 (1957); Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 612-13, 258 N.W. 497, 500-01 (1935) (bystander rule prohibits recov-
ery even though impact rule has been discarded).
22. Whetham v. Bismark Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
23. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 13, § 54, at 366-67.
24. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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a child victim as just another bystander-witness to the accident. In
place of the bystander limitation, the court substituted flexible, more
plaintiff-oriented guidelines.25 The Dillon guidelines required courts
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an injury to a plaintiff
was reasonably foreseeable. Although courts commonly apply tests of
foreseeability in negligence cases, Dillon was exceptional because it au-
thorized courts to take into account factors other than the plaintiff's
physical proximity to the accident. Most significantly, the court rec-
ognized the existence of a family relationship between the plaintiff and
the primary accident victim as a legally relevant fact. By shifting the
focus from the foreseeability of impact to the foreseeability of fright,
the court gave priority to claimants who could be expected to be
shocked at witnessing the injury of a close family member.
Courts have been less willing to jettison the bystander rule than
they were to reject the impact rule. While the equity of the bystander
limitation is now rarely defended, many courts fear that the Dillon
guidelines will not limit recovery to a sufficiently narrow class of plain-
tiffs. In these restrictive jurisdictions - most prominently New York
- the danger zone rule represents the farthest boundary for granting
recovery to those who witness accidents. 26 Thus at present, recovery
for a mother who witnesses her child's injury depends on the jurisdic-
tion in which the accident occurs and the number of feet she happens
to be from the site of the accident.
The history of the doctrine governing fright-based injury often be-
wilders students in first-year torts classes until the doctrine is de-
scribed as evidence of the law's gradual evolution toward a more
liberal, plaintiff- oriented system of recovery. The scheme becomes
more comprehensible when students are told that the old law that vir-
tually closed off recovery for fright-based injuries is gradually being
replaced by a more flexible system that permits some classes of plain-
tiffs to recover, so long as they fall within the new set of boundaries
established by the courts in the various states. Indeed, Archie Hefner,
one of the lawyers for Margery Dillon, had been impressed by a simi-
25. The Dillon court instructed that the following three factors be taken into account in
determining whether a defendant owed a plaintiff the duty not to act negligently:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who
was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sen-
sory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of
any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
68 Cal. 2d at 740-42, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
26. See, e.g., Bovsun v. Samperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
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lar prediction of liberalization offered by his torts professor at Has-
tings Law School, Arthur M. Cathcart. In 1946, Cathcart told his
class that one day courts would allow recovery for emotional distress
to a plaintiff who witnessed injury to another while standing outside
the area of impact, and that the first classes of plaintiffs to recover
would be parents and spouses. When Margery Dillon hired him, Hef-
ner understood that he had been given an opportunity to convince the
California Supreme Court to change the law of fright-based injury. He
told Margery Dillon that she would become famous in the law.
27
This evolutionary picture of the law focuses on a rebalancing of
interests between the "class" of plaintiffs and the "class" of defendants
in fright cases. This degendered narrative of the doctrinal rules, how-
ever, does not explain why this rebalancing has occurred nor whether
this change in the law should be regarded as significant.
Contemporary torts casebooks generally convey the impression
that the liberalization of rules governing fright-based injury has been a
function of two external forces: the greater ability of medical experts
and medical science to detect and understand mental disturbance, and
the courts' greater reluctance to subsidize corporate defendants who
inflict injury on individual plaintiffs.2 8 Neither the medical technology
theory nor the corporate subsidy theory, however, fully captures the
story of the legal treatment of fright-based injury. Degendered ac-
counts of the evolution of the law governing fright-based injuries fail
to account for the fact that maternal relationships are often at the
center of these cases. They also fail to acknowledge the possibility that
the "progression" of the law is related to changing societal views of
women's roles. Further, these sex-neutral accounts of the law tend to
obscure the gender significance of the basic legal hierarchy that places
material property rights above relations and emotions. The liberaliza-
tion of the law governing fright-based injuries may seem less impres-
sive if we appreciate the asymmetry of the original rules - rules that
treated emotional security as a qualitatively inferior interest and de-
scribed even physical harm to women as emotionally based.
27. Telephone interview with Archie Hefner (Aug. 13, 1987).
28. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 1049-83; M. FRANKLIN
& R. RABIN, supra note 13, at 284-320; J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 13, at 562-80;
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 13, § 54, at 360; R. POSNER, supra
note 13, at 603-10. One of the leading articles on the subsidy theory is Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 368, 382 (1951).
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III. PREGNANT PLAINTIFFS: EARLY APPLICATION OF THE
IMPACT RULE, 1888-1902
A study of the early classic cases shows that gender has played an
important role in the history of the cause of action for fright-based
physical injury, and that degendered accounts of the law of fright are
distorted and incomplete. From among the hundreds of reported deci-
sions that have applied or discussed the impact rule, a handful of cases
stand out as particularly significant, either because they were the lead-
ing statements in important jurisdictions or because they represented
alternative approaches.
The story of the law's treatment of fright-based injury begins in the
1880s, when courts in the British Empire and the United States first
confronted claims of women who asserted that they suffered physical
harm as a result of fright. Because the plaintiffs in each of the promi-
nent early cases were women, a connection between women and fright
was forged in the law of torts from the beginning. Several of these
plaintiffs were pregnant at the time of the frightening occurrence and
suffered miscarriages that they believed were caused by their fright.
Many women seeking compensation for fright-based injury also al-
leged that they suffered from some form of hysterical disorder. Three
distinct types of harms are embedded within these early suits for
fright-based injuries: (1) physical injuries, including miscarriages,
stillbirths, and hysteria-caused disabilities; (2) emotional distress,
often necessitating long periods of bed rest; and (3) the relational harm
of losing a potential child. In the late-nineteenth century, these harms
were likely to be regarded as interrelated.
There are few clues as to why women began to seek compensation
for fright-based injuries only in the late nineteenth century. The ap-
pearance of these claims may be linked to medical understandings of
conditions known as neurasthenia and hysteria. In the 1870s and
1880s, pioneering neurologists, notably George Beard and S. Weir
Mitchell, established a connection between mind and body, specifically
that mental and emotional problems may produce physical manifesta-
tions. The recognition of neurasthenia, "a disease characterized by
profound physical and mental exhaustion," 29 legitimated a category of
disease that had previously been dismissed as hypochondria. This un-
derstanding rested heavily on the work of the great French physician
29. Sicherman, The Uses of a Diagnosis: Doctors, Patients, and Neurasthenia, in SICKNESS
AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 23-24, 26, 32 (J. Leavitt & R. Numbers 2d ed. 1985). Beard's most
important treatise is G. BEARD, AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
(188 1); Mitchell's is perhaps S. MITCHELL, FAT AND BLOOD: AN ESSAY ON THE TREATMENT
OF CERTAIN FORMS OF NEURASTHENIA AND HYSTERIA (5th ed. 1888).
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Jean Martin Charcot, with whom Freud studied briefly. As Nathan
G. Hale, Jr., has explained, Charcot taught that "[h]ysterical symp-
toms were real, not feigned. Hysterics were not malingerers .... -30
In this context of a new understanding of psychosomatic illness, the
diffuse disorder known as hysteria was medicalized. Women who suf-
fered fright-based harm acquired a language that allowed them to ar-
ticulate their experience as an injury. Thus, the social and medical
forces that legitimated neurasthenia as a diagnosis in the late nine-
teenth century may also have sustained women in their perceptions
that they were entitled to both medical and legal recognition for harms
they experienced.
Despite these new understandings, the older perception that hyste-
ria was a disorder traceable to the uterus and was therefore peculiar to
women continued to persist both inside and outside the medical com-
munity. Medical definition of hysteria as an authentic illness was un-
dercut by physicians' simultaneous suspicion that, as Carroll Smith-
Rosenberg has argued, the hysterical woman was likely to be guilty of
conscious malingering, "self-indulgence," and "moral delinquency. '31
Even S. Weir Mitchell, famous for his treatment of hysterical women,
described them as "the pests of many households, who constitute the
despair of physicians, and who furnish those annoying examples of
despotic selfishness, which wreck the constitutions of nurses and de-
voted relatives, and in unconscious or half-conscious self-indulgence
destroy the comfort of everyone about them. ' 32 Therapy for hysteria
reflected this distrust: it involved isolating the patient from all except
the doctor, who then dominated the patient emotionally. 33 In short,
treatment could be punitive.
The triad of hysterical illness, fright, and injuries related to child-
birth shared a close connection to the societal view of middle- and
upper-class women as frail, dependent beings who were often unfit for
their assigned role as childbearers and childraisers.34 When women
30. N. HALE, FREUD AND THE AMERICANS: THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917, at 125 (1971).
31. C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in Nine-
teenth-Century America, in DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA 197, 203-08 (1985).
32. Id. at 207 (quoting S. W. MITCHELL, LECTURES ON THE DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS
SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY IN WOMEN 266 (2d ed. 1885)).
33. The most familiar description of the experience of the "rest cure" is Charlotte Perkins
Gilman's story The Yellow Wallpaper in C. GILMAN, THE CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN
READER 3 (1980).
34. A man's claim for fright-based injury during this period would have been much harder to
fit into this medico-social framework. The critical tie to reproductive injury would be broken in
the man's claim, not only because there would be no resulting miscarriage or stillbirth but also
because hysterical injury would not be a likely diagnosis for a male patient. While the availabil-
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turned to the courts for redress of fright-based injury, these conflicting
views surrounding hysteria reappeared. Confronted with these claims,
most courts were unwilling to elevate hysterical illness - even if
traceable as a matter of fact to negligence - to the level of a legally
cognizable harm. The courts generally echoed the ambivalence and
skepticism found in the medical profession and developed a doctrine of
fright-based injury that allowed compensation for only a fraction of
the physical injuries suffered.
The first notable case involving a claim of fright-based injury was
an Australian case decided by the Privy Council in 1888. Victorian
Railways Commissioners v. Coultas35 involved a near miss at a railroad
crossing. The plaintiff, Mary Coultas, was riding in a buggy with her
husband and brother. An employee of the defendant-railroad negli-
gently signaled the buggy to cross and Mary Coultas feared that she
and her companions would be killed by the fast-approaching train.
Mary Coultas' husband managed to get the buggy across the track, so
that the train passed close to the back of the buggy but did not touch
it. Mary Coultas fainted into the arms of her brother and there was
medical testimony to the effect that she suffered a severe nervous
shock, a miscarriage, prolonged physical illness, and impaired memory
and eyesight.
36
Without reaching the question of whether impact was necessary to
establish liability for fright-based injuries, the Privy Council denied
recovery. The Council based its holding on the narrow ground that
the damages were too remote, but listed three additional justifications
for denying recovery. Although the opinion is quite terse, it contains
virtually all of the basic arguments that would be enlisted in the ser-
vice of defendants for the next one-hundred years.
The first argument against recovery - the remoteness argument
- is somewhat difficult to understand, at least to the contemporary
reader. The court merely asserted that Mary Coultas' fright was not
to be expected in the "ordinary course of things."'37 This unadorned
statement of "fact" seems counterintuitive. Even in 1888, many per-
sons would presumably be frightened by a near collision with a loco-
motive. But the court seemed to think that Mary Coultas' injuries
were more extensive than might reasonably be expected. At one point,
ity of neurasthenia as a diagnosis made men, as well as women, more free to confess to anxieties,
insomnia, palpitations, impotence, and other nervous disorders, men still lived in a culture that
severely inhibited them from publicly confessing weakness. Sicherman, supra note 29, at 26-28.
35. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
36. 13 App. Cas. at 223; see also Coultas v. Victorian Rys., 12 V.L.R. 895 (1886) (disclosing
that plaintiff suffered a miscarriage).
37. 13 App. Cas. at 225.
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the court described her injuries as arising from "mere sudden terror
unaccompanied by any actual physical injury."' 38 Although the, court
did not explicitly classify Mary Coultas as a supersensitive person, the
court's remoteness justification echoed the defense counsel's argument
that "[a] mere nervous shock caused by fright of an impending event
which never happens results from the constitution and circumstances
of the individual."' 39 The court's definition of remoteness did not re-
flect temporal or spatial distance between the defendant's negligence
and Mary Coultas' injuries. Rather, it classified her injury as remote
because of its judgment that a normal person would not suffer physical
injuries as a result of such an incident. It therefore used "remote" to
mean "abnormal" or "unusual."
This focus on the personal characteristics and response of the
plaintiff introduced gender into the case in an unsubtle way. It was
Mary Coultas who fainted and suffered the physical effects of nervous
shock, not her brother or her husband, although they also were ex-
posed to the same danger. Fright-based injury cases inevitably deal
with a wide range of individual responses to danger. Whether under
the rubric of remoteness or some other legal principle, courts will
often make implicit judgments about the qualities of the person they
choose as the standard against which to measure individual re-
sponses.40 Mary Coultas was too delicate to qualify as a "reasonable
man" entitled to recover against a negligent defendant.
The three other reasons the court offered to justify its denial of
recovery would be viewed today as administrative in nature. The
Council expressed concern that allowing recovery in this type of case
would (1) spawn too many lawsuits, (2) open "a wide field ... for
imaginary claims," and (3) cause difficult problems of proof of causa-
tion.41 The concern here seems to be to assure that the law not pro-
vide compensation for nonexistent or trivial harm. This concern
complements the court's reluctance to compensate the sensitive plain-
tiff - unworthy plaintiffs are denied recovery because they either
overreact to incidents, lie about their injuries, or delude themselves
into believing that the defendant's negligence was the source of their
harm. Like the remoteness rationale, these administrative reasons for
denying recovery may not be divorced from considerations of the
38. 13 App. Cas. at 225.
39. 13 App. Cas. at 222.
40. See Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 57-65 (1989) (critiquing of gender bias underlying reasonable person stan-
dard); see also Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3,
20-25 (1988).
41. 13 App. Cas. at 225-26.
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plaintiff's gender. Because these rationales focus on the likely trust-
worthiness of the plaintiff and the probable justness of her claim, the
identity of the typical plaintiff becomes the deciding factor.
The American counterpart to Mary Coultas was Annie Mitchell,
the plaintiff in a famous 1896 New York case, Mitchell v. Rochester
Railway.42 Mitchell is a particularly dramatic near-miss case. While
Annie Mitchell was waiting to board one of the defendant's railway
cars, a horse car driven by defendant's employee came so close to hit-
ting her that "she stood between the horses' heads when they were
stopped."'43 Corroborated by medical testimony, Annie Mitchell
claimed that her fright caused her to lose consciousness and suffer a
miscarriage.
The New York court's reasons for denying recovery were very sim-
ilar to those of the Privy Council in Coultas.44 In addition to the four
arguments advanced in the earlier case, however, the New York court
contended that it was "logical" to deny recovery for the physical ef-
fects of fright because fright alone was not a legally cognizable in-
jury.45 This seemingly neutral doctrinal observation did not survive
the scrutiny of the legal commentators of the day. Writing six years
after Mitchell was decided, Professor Francis Bohlen chastised the
court for failing to distinguish a fright-based injury case resulting in
physical harm from a case that involved purely emotional harm.46 No
logic required physical harm to be viewed as parasitic or subordinate
to the fright. The legal question could be framed in a way that was
more receptive to plaintiff's position, Le., why should the law treat
physical injury produced by fright less favorably than physical harm
produced by any other causal mechanism?
In Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad,47 decided one year after
Mitchell, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reiterated and
42. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 35 (1896).
43. 151 N.Y. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354.
44. The Mitchell court found it "quite obvious" that Annie Mitchell's miscarriage was "the
result of an accidental or unusual combination of circumstances, which could not have been
reasonably anticipated." 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. Thus, her miscarriage was "too re-
mote" to warrant recovery, even if there were a genuine causal connection between the fright and
her injury. Further, the court expressed concern that these types of cases "would naturally result
in a flood of litigation," 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354, in which plaintiffs would either feign
injury or, even if sincere, would produce only a speculative connection between the fright exper-
ienced and the harm suffered.
45. 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354.
46. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50 AM.
L. REG. 141, 172 (1902).
47. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). The case was retried and a second jury verdict for the




built upon the arguments presented in both Coultas and Mitchell
Margaret Spade was a passenger on the defendant's railway when the
defendant's employees forcibly ejected two drunken passengers stand-
ing beside her. Although plaintiff was actually grazed by one of the
ejected passengers as he "lurched" off the car, Margaret Spade admit-
ted that it was the fear caused by the incident that produced her subse-
quent hysterical paralysis and other ailments. 48
The Spade opinion is notable for its candor. The court did not rely
on the pegs of remoteness or absence of proximate cause to deny re-
covery, but instead focused squarely on the relevant qualities of the
plaintiff and defendant. The court believed that only "a timid or sensi-
tive person" might suffer a physical injury because of fright.4 9 The
court's unwillingness to believe that a normal person would suffer
physical harm from fright is much like that of its predecessors. But
the court also went beyond prior cases to reach the normative conclu-
sion that the law ought not to be structured to protect the interests of
this group of unusually sensitive persons. The Massachusetts court
openly expressed its concern that a ruling for the plaintiff would jeop-
ardize "[n]ot only the transportation of passengers and the running of
trains, but the general conduct of business and of the ordinary affairs
of life." °50 In its view, the "logical vindication" of the impact rule was
that it would be unreasonable to hold a "merely negligent" defendant
to pay for even the real consequences of fright.
51
The image that emerges from Spade is one of a hypersensitive
plaintiff whose claims pose a threat to business-as-usual. Even though
ordinary tort principles allowed recovery only when the defendant was
negligent and the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, the
Massachusetts court feared that the application of these ordinary prin-
ciples in cases of fright-based injuries would impose a disproportionate
liability on defendants. This sense of disproportion arose both from
the court's view of plaintiff's injury as marginal and from its belief in
the social importance of defendant's activity.
Justice Holmes incorporated the public policy aspects of Spade in a
later Massachusetts case, Homans v. Boston Elevated Railway.52 In
Homans, a woman experienced "a good deal of suffering of a hysteri-
48. Spade, 168 Mass. at 286, 47 N.E. at 88. It was in a later opinion, Homans v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 N.E. 737, 737 (1902), that Margaret Spade's condition was
described as hysterical paralysis.
49. 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88.
50. 168 Mass. at 289, 47 N.E. at 89.
51. 168 Mass. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89.
52. 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902).
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cal nature" as a result of a nervous shock stemming from a subway
collision.53 Holmes treated the impact rule as the pragmatic accom-
modation of public policy interests - defendants would be held liable
to sensitive plaintiffs only if the plaintiffs could guarantee the genuine-
ness of their fright-based injury by showing "a substantial battery of
the person," i.e., a non-negligible impact.5 4 In Homans, Holmes deter-
mined that recovery was justified because there was evidence that the
plaintiff had been thrown against a seat in the collision. This nuance
in the facts thus meant the difference between recovery and dismissal.
Holmes was willing to tolerate the harsh, arbitrary character of the
rule and to favor the interests of industry against the fragile plaintiff,
so long as the court would not also have to adjudicate a claim for
physical injury. If a plaintiff were already properly in court with a
claim based on an injury stemming directly from the contemporaneous
impact, Holmes wished to save the court the trouble of determining
whether the shock came from the battery or from the fright. Thus, the
plaintiff could find legal protection if her claim posed no additional
burden on judicial administration. The impact rule thereby afforded
fright-based injury only precarious and contingent protection: women
who suffered from the effects of fright might be allowed recovery pro-
vided the all-important outside impact could be proven.
Just as the impact rule was being firmly established in many Amer-
ican jurisdictions, however, it lost favor in the courts of Great Britain.
The most famous case allowing damages for fright-based injuries even
in the absence of physical impact is Dulieu v. White & Sons, 55 decided
in 1901. Again, the plaintiff was a pregnant woman, who claimed that
her shock caused her to give birth prematurely to an "idiot" infant.
The only significant fact distinguishing Dulieu from the earlier cases
was the plaintiffs location at the time of the incident: rather than
being on the street, the plaintiff was tending bar in her husband's pub-
lic house when the defendant negligently charged his team of horses
into the premises.
In a long, scholarly opinion, Judge Kennedy refused to follow
Coultas and its American progeny and dispensed with the impact rule.
He believed that fright could cause physical injuries and that such in-
juries were not too remote as a matter of law. His basic approach was
to compare fright-based injuries to other types of transportation-
related injuries. He argued that in collision and "running-down"
cases, plaintiffs were compensated for all injuries to their health, in-
53. 180 Mass. at 457, 62 N.E. at 737.
54. 180 Mass. at 458, 62 N.E. at 737.
55. 2 K.B. 669 (1901).
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cluding not only those resulting as an immediate consequence of the
impact, but also those resulting from the "sequelae" of the occurrence
- the sum of the physical and emotional trauma ensuing from the
incident.56 Moreover, in cases other than those involving fright-based
injuries, the established rule was to impose liability on the defendant
for all the damages actually inflicted, even if the plaintiff was of the
"thin-skulled" sort who suffered a greater loss than would the average
or normal individual. Kennedy reasoned that a pregnant woman who
suffered a miscarriage or premature birth from fright should be treated
no less favorably than the man with a thin skull.57 His legal attack on
the remoteness justification for denying relief was simple, yet novel -
fright-caused injury was not qualitatively different from other kinds of
physical injury and there was nothing so unusual about miscarriages
or other pregnancy-related harms to warrant special legal treatment.
As for the administrative grounds for denying relief - principally the
fear of fictitious or unmeritorious claims - Kennedy expressed more
faith than his predecessors in the court's ability to "get at the truth in
this class of claim."'5
8
Kennedy's opinion did not display any particular appreciation of
gender. He did not, for example, stress the severity of the injury to the
plaintiff or emphasize the fact that she was pregnant. Instead, his
plaintiff orientation seemed to derive from his belief that nervous
shock is a real harm not substantially different from other injuries for
which the law grants compensation in tort.
The concurring opinion in Dulieu, by Judge Phillimore, also sup-
ported recovery but on a much narrower ground. Unlike Judge Ken-
nedy, Phillimore followed the arguments expressed in Spade that
public policy justified the refusal to protect "unfit" persons, including
pregnant women, from the hazards of transportation when there was
no collision.59 However, he concluded that whatever leeway was nec-
essary to protect the day-to-day operations of railway companies and
similar defendants ought not insulate them from liability for harms
they caused to persons in their own homes. The pregnant plaintiff
deserved compensation in this case because she was in her home,
"where she had a right, and on some occasions a duty, to be." 60 Gen-
der thus found its way into Phillimore's opinion as relevant to delimit-
ing the scope of the defendant's duty. Inside the home, pregnancy and
56. 2 K.B. at 678 (Kennedy, J.).
57. 2 K.B. at 679 (Kennedy, J.).
58. 2 K.B. at 681 (Kennedy, J.).
59. 2 K.B. at 684 (Phillimore, J., concurring).
60. 2 K.B. at 685 (Phillimore, J., concurring).
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its dangers would be safeguarded from external hazards, but a preg-
nant women might be required to bear the risks of machines and
human negligence once she ventured outside.
These early impact-rule cases did not explicitly turn on the sex of
the plaintiff; the legal rules that emerged from the opinions were
worded neutrally. But the fright-based injuries themselves at issue in
the classic cases were not gender-neutral. Miscarriage, premature
birth, and "hysterical" disorders described women's health problems;
the case law administering the impact rule was necessarily the law's
administration of redress for gender-related harms. In other cases of
negligently produced physical harms, formal legal doctrine required
compensation for all proximately caused injuries. The law's treatment
of fright-based harms was much less generous.
The early cases suggest that the vitality of the restrictive doctrine
was related to the sex of the plaintiffs and the gender based nature of
their injuries. Beyond the fact that the plaintiffs were women and fre-
quently complained of gender-related harms, the gendered nature of
this cause of action comes through by means of three legally signifi-
cant judgments articulated by the courts.
First, there was the belief that only supersensitive or abnormally
delicate persons could suffer physical harms from fright. The standard
here seems to be male; it certainly is nonpregnant persons. The con-
ventional wisdom of the time accepted the notion that miscarriages
and other birth-related harms could stem from fright or nervous shock
and that it was not abnormal for pregnant women to suffer such re-
sponses, at least if the stimuli were frightening enough.61 In gauging
the normality of a person's internal response to danger, the courts
either did not take the hazards posed to pregnant women into account,
or they regarded them as so unique as to warrant special, less solici-
tous treatment. In the first edition of his famous treatise on torts, Wil-
61. See Morris v. L. & W. R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 201, 77 A. 445 (1910) ("It is a matter not only
of scientific but of common knowledge that miscarriages are often caused by fright or nervous
shock .. ") This understanding faded only slowly. As late as 1932 one standard text observed:
"Accidents which affect the mother frequently produce abortion: such as a fall... a sudden and
great fright and an overwhelming and prostrating emotion." E. DAVIS, COMPLICATIONS OF
PREGNANCY 127 (1932). But other authorities had begun to question the older wisdom: "The
emotions, fright, anger and grief, are not only rare but questionable causes of [spontaneous]
abortion .... [One researcher] could attribute [spontaneous] abortion to the emotions in only
1.6% of his [cases]." Litzenberg, Spontaneous Abortion and Premature Labor, in I OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY 1084, 1094 (H. Curtis ed. 1934). By the 1970s, obstetricians believed that
"most spontaneous abortions . . . occur some time after death of the embryo or fetus" and,
therefore, "[i]f abortion were caused by [psychic or physical] trauma, it would likely not be a
very recent accident but an event that had occurred some weeks before." 3. PRICHARD & P.
MACDONALD, WILLIAMS' ON OBSTETRICS 591 (16th ed. 1980). Still it remained possible that a




liam Prosser remarked that "[i]t is not difficult to discover in the
earlier opinions a distinctly masculine astonishment that any woman
should ever be so silly as to allow herself to be frightened or shocked
into a miscarriage." 62
Second, there was a fear that allowing a cause of action for fright-
based injury would open the courts to imaginary claims. Not only did
the courts seem to distrust the legal system's ability to ferret out the
weak claims; they seemed to distrust the potential claimants. Because
miscarriages and stillbirths are empirically verifiable events, the dis-
trust in this class of cases is hard to fathom. Difficult problems of
proving causation could occur in individual cases, but such problems
were not unique to miscarriage cases and might occur in cases involv-
ing other bodily disorders arising subsequently to a traumatic event.
The fear of imaginary claims may have stemmed in part from a fear
that women would be unreasonable in their assessment of the causes of
pregnancy-related problems and would seek to place the blame for
misfortune externally.
Third, the cases displayed a sympathy for the plight of corporate
defendants exposed to claims by a potentially large class of persons.
The attitude seemed to be that the infirm, the unfit, and the sensitive
must take their chances when they venture outside their homes. The
message to pregnant women was that the dangers of injury, and partic-
ularly of uncompensated injury, increased on the public streets. The
structure of legal recovery reinforced the notion that women's proper
sphere was domestic and that industry would not be compelled to ac-
commodate women's interest in freedom of mobility, at least when
they were pregnant. This assumption, taken together with the other
two negative judgments, provided the policy arguments against afford-
ing compensation to women who suffered fright-based physical harm.
The theoretical support for denying recovery came from judicial
placement of physical harm caused by fright in a separate legal cate-
gory from physical harm caused by impact. This legal distinction
transformed a recurring physical injury to women - fright-based mis-
carriages and other birth-related trauma - into a special type of non-
physical harm that the law would not recognize. The legal system is
generally willing to assign legitimacy to harrms viewed as arising from
forces outside the body of the injured party. Difficulties occur when
the harm seems to arise from within the body of the plaintiff. Women
who suffer fright-based miscarriages experience a particular type of
interference with physical integrity, an invasion that is often problem-
62. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 55 (Ist ed. 1941).
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atically described as injury from within. 63 The legal response to this
type of interference was to label the case one of emotional disturbance,
thereby placing it at the margin of the law rather than at its center. In
this way, the law's category of emotional harm was gendered as fe-
male.64 The history of this tort is also the history of women's tort law.
IV. FINDING GENDER IN THE IMPACT RULE: PRE-REALIST
COMMENTARY, 1902-1921
In general, traditionalist legal scholars in the first two decades of
the twentieth century were critical of the reasoning and most of the
results of the early restrictive cases. Many were unconvinced that
there were persuasive reasons for a wholesale denial of recovery for
fright-based physical injuries. The liberal attitudes expressed reflected
a faith in the ability of medical science to aid the law in this area, with
little conscious focus on the gender-related nature of the tort beyond a
recitation of the facts of the major cases.
The first widely cited American law review article on fright was
written by Francis Bohen,65 a University of Pennsylvania law profes-
sor who would later become the first Reporter for the Restatement of
Torts.66 The major thesis of his 1902 article, which would be taken up
by the courts when they wished to dismantle the impact rule, was that
a fright-based physical injury case should be viewed as just another
kind of physical injury case, rather than as an attempt to expand re-
covery to encompass purely mental suffering. 67 By viewing fright as
the mechanism by which legally cognizable harm is produced, Bohlen
undercut the argument for viewing these cases as conceptually dis-
tinct. Most importantly, he predicted no special difficulty with proof
of causation, because of his belief that medical testimony could prove
the causal connection "quite as accurately" in non-impact cases as in
impact cases.68 He did not display open mistrust of the credibility of
63. Robin West draws a distinction between a harm of "annihilation" and a harm of "inva-
sion." "Annihilation" in traditional liberal legal theory is a violent threat external to the body.
In contrast, the harm of "invasion," not as well recognized in law, is a violent threat emerging
from inside the body, as, for example, with the fetus in an unwanted pregnancy. West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 59-60 (1988). Miscarriages induced by fright alone
were considered harm from "within," despite the fact that an external stimuli prompted the
internal reaction.
64. For a discussion of gender not only as "a constitutive element of social relationships" but
also as "a primary way of signifying relationships of power," see Scott, Gender: A Useful Cate-
gory of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIsT. REV. 1053, 1069 (1986).
65. Bohlen, supra note 46.
66. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS xi (1934).




pregnant women and apparently was not worried that this class of
plaintiffs would falsely or mistakenly attribute the cause of their mis-
carriages or other birth-related traumas to the actions of defendants.
6 9
Bohlen's response to the standard remoteness argument was equally
straightforward: it was problematic to view pregnancy as extraordi-
nary or unusual because there was always a certain number of preg-
nant women in every community.70 Bohlen's liberal position thus
stemmed from an assessment that the logic of the early cases was defi-
cient, coupled with a confidence that medical science could be relied
upon to delimit the scope of legal liability. His argument was ulti-
mately reflected in the position of the First Restatement of Torts,
which repudiated the impact rule.71 For the next three decades, Boh-
len's article would serve as the foundation for many of the traditional
critiques of the impact rule.
Another leader of the Restatement movement - Herbert Good-
rich - employed science, rather than legal argument, as his principal
weapon against the impact rule. Goodrich's 1921 article 72 was unu-
sual because it went beyond traditional case analysis to value scientific
thinking over legal precedent in arguing for a broader scope of recov-
ery. Goodrich cast his argument in Darwinian terms.73 Relying prin-
cipally on two medical treatises for empirical support,74 his basic
assumption was that fear, properly viewed, is not a "purely emotional
thing."'75 He variously described the physical manifestations of fear as
putting the body in shape "for fight or flight," as "clearing the decks
for action," and as putting the "whole human body on a war basis."
76
He speculated that harmful physical effects from fear are produced
when there is no opportunity "to put strong feeling into action."' 77 As
69. It is interesting to contrast Bohlen's liberal attitude toward recovery for fright-based
physical injury with his views on the proper limits of workers' compensation. Bohlen argued
against recovery under workers' compensation for occupational disease on the grounds that a
workers' compensation scheme encompassing occupational disease could not fairly allocate risks
among employers and would discourage employers from hiring older workers. Bohlen, A Prob-
lem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L. REV. 328, 348 (1912). He
also predicted that workers would either "fabricate" claims or would mistakenly, even though in
good faith, attribute the disease to their work. Id. at 345. This mistrust of workers is reminis-
cent of the mistrust the Victorian courts displayed for female plaintiffs in fright cases, a mistrust
that Bohlen did not appear to share.
70. Bohlen, supra note 46, at 154 n.37.
71. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 66, § 436, at 1117-18.
72. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 495 (1922).
73. Id. at 498 n.5 (citing Darwin for an explanation of the physical symptoms of fright).
74. Id. at 498 n.6 (citing W. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND
RAGE (1915) and G. CRILE, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS (1915)).
75. Id. at 499.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 502.
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for the right of legal recovery, Goodrich argued simply that as long as
we "can trace and can see" the physical effects of fright, the law ought
to afford recovery.
78
From a feminist perspective, the fascinating aspect of Goodrich's
article is the masculine rhetoric in which he generally described
human response to frightening situations. From his account of the
physiological changes that occur in the face of fear, Goodrich en-
couraged the reader to believe that fear is something that happens to
men. Goodrich compared "[t]onight's passenger in the luxurious Pull-
man car, awakened from slumber by the.., cries of the injured in a
railroad wreck" to "his prehistoric ancestor, battling bare-handed for
his very life with his enemies of the jungle. ' 79 For examples to sup-
port his thesis, he referred to the reactions of soldiers, 0 a urine test
done on the players of the Harvard football team,"' and the responses
of businessmen following a decline in the New York stock market."?
Finally, to make the point that some kinds of emotional stimuli are
"reinvigorating" rather than debilitating, Goodrich claimed that "the
tired business man guesses right when he chooses the excitement of a
whirly-girly show, instead of going home to bed."1
83
These images of combative, worldly men exposed to frightening or
emotionally stimulating events contrast sharply with the image that
emerged from the case law of the fragile, pregnant woman who suffers
a miscarriage from nervous shock. The only instance in which Good-
rich referred explicitly to a female subject was in a hypothetical case
based loosely on the facts of Spade.8 4 He posited that "A, in a condi-
tion of partial intoxication which slightly interferes with his locomo-
tion, meets a woman on the sidewalk. He does nothing. But she
becomes frightened at him, suffers a shock, subsequent miscarriage,
nervous prostration, other ills ad lib. "85 In analyzing his own hypo-
thetical case, Goodrich assured the reader that because A had not
acted negligently, no recovery would be forthcoming regardless of the
injuries sustained. He then generalized that given the requirement of
proof of negligence, "there seems slight danger that defendants will be
placed at the mercy of the hysterical, the morbid, or the emotionally
78. Id. at 503.
79. Id. at 499.
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id. at 502.
82. Id. at 503.
83. Id. at 502.
84. Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).




Goodrich's association of women with unreasonable emotional re-
sponse is reminiscent of the arguments advanced in support of the im-
pact rule.87 The interesting feature of the article, however, is that
Goodrich generally supported recovery for fright-based injury, at least
when the injury was conceived of as happening to normal men. The
distrust of claimants surfaced when the injury was feminized and did
not fit as well into Goodrich's masculinized account of the human re-
sponse to fear.
V. FRIGHTENED MOTHERS: THE LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE
BYSTANDER RULE, 1923-1935
In jurisdictions where the impact rule was in force, the question of
whether recovery could be granted to witnesses to accidents did not
need to be addressed. With the lifting or softening of the impact limi-
tation, however, plaintiffs other than the primary accident victims
were able to bring suit and the courts were forced to consider whether
physical injury produced by fright at witnessing the fate of another
should be actionable. Like the near-miss cases before them, the early
bystander cases involved claims of women. The near-miss cases, how-
ever, frequently involved pregnancy-related injuries and thus were
linked to women in a biological sense. The relationship of women to
the bystander cases was more obviously social in nature, rather than
biological. Mothers tended to care for young children and to suffer
nervous shock at the injury of their children. The recurring claims of
mothers suing as witnesses to the injury of their children may also be a
function of an assessment by attorneys that mothers would make par-
ticularly sympathetic plaintiffs and would increase the chances of pre-
vailing in this legally difficult cause of action.
The early precedents generally denied recovery if the fright causing
the injury were produced by concern for another. This bright-line lim-
itation had the advantage of limiting the class of plaintiffs to those who
were close enough to the dangerous instrumentality to be physically
endangered themselves. It had the significant disadvantage, however,
of discounting intimate family relationships, because the only legally
actionable fright was individually based.
The legal origin of the bystander rule stems from a dictum in the
English case of Dulieu v. White & Sons8 8 that repudiated the impact
86. Id. at 507.
87. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
88. 2 K.B. 669 (1901); see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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limitation. In speculating on the legal effect of lifting the impact re-
quirement, Judge Kennedy stressed that he was not endorsing recov-
ery in all cases of fright-based physical harm. He claimed that the
plaintiff must prove that "[t]he shock, where it operates through the
mind, must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immedi-
ate personal injury to oneself."8 9 Kennedy's opinion did not elaborate
on the legal or policy bases of the bystander rule beyond suggesting
that a defendant would owe no duty to a plaintiff who feared injury to
a third party, because injury to such plaintiffs was too remote or
unforeseeable.
In the United States, the Dulieu dictum met with widespread ap-
proval. 90 The objections to recovery closely tracked those found in the
impact-rule cases. From a doctrinal perspective, the bystander issue
represented round two in the larger controversy over legal recognition
of fright-based harms. A typical case arose in Wisconsin in 1935 when
Susie Waube looked outside the window of her home and saw her
daughter struck and killed by a negligent driver.91 Susie Waube be-
came "extremely hysterical, sick and prostrated" 92 and died less than
a month later. Her husband brought a survival action to claim the
recovery to which his wife would have been entitled had she lived.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, concluding
that the defendant owed no duty to protect Susie Waube from harm.
The court's reasons for denying recovery echoed those advanced a
generation earlier in the impact rule cases.93 As in the Spade 94 case,
the court candidly admitted that logic would provide no answer to the
legal question posed and that "[tlhe answer must be reached by bal-
ancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far de-
fendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be
89. 2 K.B. at 675.
90. The commentary to the Second Restatement of Torts indicated that, after 1930, the cases
were opposed to liability toward "bystanders." The only support for liability in bystander cases
came from three decisions in intermediate courts decided prior to 1915. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) oF TORTS § 313, note to Institute (rent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
91. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 603-04, 258 N.W. 497, 497 (1935).
92. 216 Wis. at 604, 258 N.W. at 497.
93. See supra notes 37-41, 44, and accompanying text. The twin concerns of disproportion-
ate liability and encouragement of fraudulent claims surfaced again. Like the Massachusetts
court in Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897), the Wisconsin court
believed that imposing liability in bystander cases would put an "unreasonable burden" on users
of the highway, but gave no hint as to why the interests of the mother of the victim should be
subordinated to the interests of users of the highway. Nor did the court indicate why this class of
claims posed a different or greater incentive to fabrication than other fright-based claims, which
were now allowed in Wisconsin, one of the growing number of jurisdictions where the impact
rule had been rejected. Waube, 216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.




The court began its analysis by characterizing Susie Waube's inju-
ries as so "unusual or extraordinary" that they would not be expected
by a negligent driver as a likely consequence of an accident.96 The
court did not specify what feature of the accident was so unusual -
the presence of the victim's mother at the accident site, or the
mother's severe response to the killing of her child. As countless com-
mentators later pointed out,9 7 neither the mother's presence nor her
reaction seems unusual at all. Mothers often tend to supervise young
children and the mother-child relationship is emotionally close. As
with the remoteness argument in the impact-rule cases, the unforesee-
ability argument in the bystander cases is probably best understood as
a proxy for some other concern. It is possible that the courts regarded
fright-caused physical injury as an overreaction to the death of an-
other, a reaction that would not occur in a normal individual. The
reasonableness of this assessment, however, hinges on whether the
court regarded the plaintiff as a "mere bystander" or as a mother.
The Waube court's weightiest reason for denying liability was its
concern with finding a clear-cut "stopping place" for liability in the
bystander context. 98 Various classes of persons might suffer mental
distress as a result of witnessing injury to another: parents, spouses,
other relatives, friends, and even strangers who witness the accident.
Moreover, the number of potential plaintiffs could increase considera-
bly if the law chose to compensate those persons who were not present
at the scene of the accident but who suffered distress when they
learned of it. This specter of greatly enhanced liability perhaps was
exaggerated, particularly because all plaintiffs would then have been
required to prove that they also suffered physical harm as a conse-
quence of their distress. Nevertheless, the bystander cases clearly
posed a multiple liability problem insofar as defendants would face
potential liability both to the primary accident victim and to any wit-
nesses. The ultimate scope of a defendant's liability might then de-
pend on the court's view of the significance of the personal
relationship between the witness and the primary accident victim.99
95. Waube, 216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
96. 216 Wis. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
97. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 90, at 10; J. FLEMING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 53 (1967); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 37, at 181 (2d ed. 1955).
98. 216 Wis., at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
99. Judicial creation of a hierarchy of relationships was not unprecedented in tort law. The
courts had long restricted claims for loss of consortium to husbands who lost the services of their
wives as a result of a defendant's negligence. See W. MALONE, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL: INJU-
RIES TO FAMILY, SOCIAL AND TRADE RELATIONS § 3-1, at 56-57 (1979). Under various stat-
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The maternal relationship emerged as a decisive factor in the 1925
English case of Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, 100 a rare case permitting
recovery to a mother whose child was severely injured in a traffic acci-
dent. Mrs. Hambrook had just parted from her children on their
route to school when she saw a runaway lorry careening down the hill
in the direction of her children. When she learned from bystanders
that a little girl had been struck and taken away, she sustained a ner-
vous shock and a severe hemorrhage. Two and a half months later,
she suffered a stillbirth and died shortly thereafter.
The court refused to follow the Dulieut01 dictum, and relied in-
stead on its perception of the quality of the mother-child relationship
as a justification for recovery. The requirement that plaintiff prove
fear for herself as opposed to fear for another struck the court as unac-
ceptable when the "bystander" was the victim's mother. To demon-
strate the injustice of the bystander limitation, one judge hypothesized
the following scenario:
Assume two mothers crossing the street at the same time when this lorry
comes thundering down, each holding a small child by the hand. One
mother is courageous and devoted to her child. She is terrified, but
thinks only of the damage to the child, and not at all about herself. The
other woman is timid and lacking in the motherly instinct. She also is
terrified, but thinks only of the damage to herself and not at all about her
child. The health of both mothers is seriously affected by the mental
shock occasioned by the fright. Can any real distinction be drawn be-
tween the two cases? Will the law recognize a cause of action in the case
of the less deserving mother, and none in the case of the more deserving
one? Does the law say that the defendant ought reasonably to have an-
ticipated the non-natural feeling of the timid mother, and not the natural
feeling of the courageous mother? I think not. 102
By thus associating fear for another with maternal instinct, the court
explicitly feminized this species of tort claim. The court restated the
question as a choice between validating the maternal instinct by per-
mitting recovery or following a "discreditable" system of jurispru-
dence that rewarded nonmaternal mothers who valued themselves
above their children. 103
Today Hambrook may appear sexist because of its acceptance of
unselfishness as the marker of natural motherhood. It is no longer
utes, wrongful death recovery had generally been restricted to spouses or children of the
deceased. Id., § 2-4, at 25-29. However, the courts'tended not to draw these relational lines
when it was emotional stress, rather than relational harm, that was the basis of plaintiffs claim.
100. 1 K.B. 141 (1925).
101. Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901); see supra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text.
102. 1 K.B. at 151 (Bankes, L.J.).
103. 1 K.B. at 157 (Atkin, L.J.).
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assumed that mothers are naturally or biologically courageous. Nor
does it seem particularly courageous or desirable to forget about one's
own personal safety in a dangerous situation. But what is striking
about the Hambrook analysis is that it fashioned the rule of the case
with women, and the particular plaintiff, uppermost in mind. In con-
trast to the cases denying recovery, the court did not characterize the
injury as unusual or remote, in part because of its view that mothers
would naturally worry about their children and suffer fright at their
peril. The court expanded the objectivity of the law to encompass the
reality of a familial relationship. By placing a high value on mother-
hood, the court created an adequate counterweight to the fear of dis-
proportionate liability. Hambrook indicates that courts may
sometimes be gender-conscious in favor of women. It would be al-
most fifty years, however, before the Hambrook arguments would
prove powerful enough to turn the tide in favor of recovery in the
United States.
VI. THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE: LEON GREEN DISSECTS THE
TRADITION, 1933
By the time Professor Leon Green tackled the fright cases in his
1933 article in the Illinois Law Review, 104 there was a sizable body of
reported decisions treating fright-based injuries. Green dissected this
tradition using a new and distinctive approach - legal realism. Green
was a major figure in the realist movement. When in 1931 Karl Llew-
ellyn listed the nation's leading legal realists, Leon Green was on the
list - a list that also included William 0. Douglas, Charles Clark, and
Jerome Frank.105 Green's work on fright and his more general articles
on negligence law106 were very influential. Only William Prosser, and
perhaps a few others, had comparable reputations as torts scholars. 1°7
Although Green was always skeptical of labels and usually took
the position that he was simply being pragmatic, his 1933 article on
the fright cases displayed the characteristic methods that were already
104. Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 U. ILL. L. REv. 761 (1933). Green published a second part
to this article, Green, "Fright Cases, " 27 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 873 (1933), that discusses fright-based
harms deriving from intentional torts. Since our analysis deals with harms deriving from negli-
gence, we have limited our discussion to Green's first article.
105. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931).
106. Green's major articles are collected in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT
LAW (1965).




being associated with the new realist school of legal thought.108 Real-
ists suspected that the rhetoric of precedent and tradition had been a
vehicle for mystifying convenient political choices. The realists be-
lieved that the best basis for legal truth was knowledge of facts; they
were skeptical of legal principle as a guide to the understanding of
historical reality. Their skepticism was founded in part on the techno-
logical changes in publishing court decisions that had transformed the
profession in the first third of the century: the inundation of reported
cases from the state supreme courts and the federal circuits made it
increasingly clear that actual decisions reflected idiosyncrasy and con-
tradiction quite as much as they did legal principle. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, Green's generation of intellectuals - not only in the
law but in the social sciences, humanities, and arts - were impelled
by the faith that a science of human behavior could be developed. Not
unlike the documentary photographers whose work resonated through
the 1930s, or the WPA interviewers who collected the autobiographies
of thousands of former slaves, the legal realists were suspicious of free-
floating "natural laws," believing rather that sound decisions would
emerge only after all the facts had been collected.109
Green shared the realist suspicion of legal principle, including the
principle that the law afforded no remedy for fright-based physical in-
jury. He claimed that "[n]ine times out of ten [legal principles] are far
broader than the cases from which they are deduced, and thereby are
highly deceptive."110
Green's major contribution to the scholarship on fright was his
discovery of cases neglected by others and his unwillingness to accept
the old conceptual framework as the starting point for discussion. At
the time Green was writing, the standard critique of the impact rule
had been offered by Bohlen, who had argued that fright causing physi-
cal injury should be actionable regardless of the presence of impact.11
Green'was not interested in debating the logical merits of the impact
rule. He preferred to group the cases around factual similarities or
situation types, creating three new categories: derailment, passenger,
and general traffic.
112
Green's article suggested that the outcomes in fright-based injury
108. An insightful discussion of the characteristics of the diverse group known as the legal
realists is contained in Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988).
109. See Purcell, American Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of
Democratic Theory, 75 Am. Hisr. REV. 424 (1969).
110. Green, supra note 104, at 765.
111. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
112. Green, supra note 104, at 763, 768, 775.
[Vol. 88:814
Law of Fright
cases were more likely to be influenced by contextual differences than
by the presence or absence of physical impact. Green maintained that
it was easier to assign responsibility to defendants in passenger or de-
railment cases than in general traffic cases. In general traffic cases, the
courts were confronted with "infinite" problems created when "the
pedestrian, the adjoining dweller, the operators of horse-drawn vehi-
cles, street cars, railroads, and automobiles, together with their occu-
pants, are subjected to risks."
1 13
In recategorizing the cases, Green attempted to be exhaustive. He
considered not only the prominent decisions but presumably all of the
reported fright cases. a14 The picture that emerged from Green's dis-
section of these cases is a complicated one. No single factor or set of
factors would explain the results in all the cases, although Green's
analysis yielded a laundry list of possibly important factors. Green's
major point seems to be that there never was a uniformity of results in
this area; he also maintained that uniformity would not be
desirable.115
Green occasionally appeared to be an apologist for the results of
the cases, principally because he treated each decision as a social fact;
he did not pass explicit moral judgment or assess the wisdom of social
policy. Ironically, Green's radical methodology was used to defend
the status quo in this area of tort law - Green's work later would be
cited by conservative judges seeking a new rationalization for restric-
tive legal precedent limiting recovery.116 Green's position illustrates
what Joseph Singer calls the ambivalence of many realist scholars.
117
As a realist, Green derided conceptual thinking and the notion that
legal results were preordained and separated from social reality. But
Green seemed to believe that paying close attention to the facts would
provide an explanation of results, even if precise predictions were im-
possible. Green did not appreciate fully that the scholar or judge must
actively choose which facts are pertinent. The situation-types Green
selected described his own perception of the social reality of fright
113. Id. at 768.
114. For example, Green unearthed a very early derailment case from Illinois that was far
less hostile to recovery than later cases would suggest. Id. at 763 n.14 (citing Chicago & N.W.
Ry. Co v. Hunerberg, 16 IIl. App. 387 (1885)).
115. Id. at 762.
116. For example, Green is cited in two notable cases denying recovery to mothers who
witnessed their children's injury: Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 606, 258 N.W. 497, 498
(1935); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 308-09, 379 P.2d 513, 520-21,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40-41 (1963) (en banc); see also supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text
(discussing Waube), and infra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Amaya).
117. Singer, supra note 108, at 502-03.
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cases; as a realist writing in the 1930s, he did not perceive that these
fright cases might entail multiple social realities.
One of the few generalizations in which Green indulged was that
courts in the early 1930s were becoming more liberal in granting re-
covery, even in states that clung to the impact rule. He speculated
that the change was a product of two social forces: the growing
number of serious traffic injuries in the age of the automobile and the
"more substantial" scientific basis for proving harm through fear. 1 8
Despite Green's realist penchant for fact-sensitivity, he did not an-
alyze the significance of gender as a factor influencing judgment. In
the very first paragraph of his fright article, Green made the point that
some courts had mistrusted claims of fright-based injuries. He then
made a significant observation about the marginalization of this type
of lawsuit: "Their labels as 'fright' or 'mental suffering' cases signify
the distrust with which they were at first, and still are, regarded by
some courts. With few exceptions, recoveries have been restricted to
women, and for most part, pregnant women."11 9 That is all Green
had to say about gender. His single observation suggests that the
fright cause of action is marginal to the law of torts and perhaps that
only female plaintiffs stand a good chance of prevailing.
Green's observation about the gender of the plaintiffs in fright
cases was not inaccurate, although it can be misleading. Green cited
forty negligence cases in which fright was alleged to have caused the
plaintiff's injury. In thirty-five of these cases the person suffering
fright-based injury was a woman; only five cases involved men suing
for the effects of fright. But neither men nor women fared very well in
the courts. Of the women, only fourteen won their suits; of the men,
only two were successful. 120 The significant datum is not that women
recovered in more lawsuits than men, because they also lost more
suits. The significant fact is that women tended to bring this type of
lawsuit far more often than did men. Green was correct in thinking of
fright-based injury as a woman-dominated claim, but his implication
that the claims of women were favored by the courts was unsupported
by the cases he cited.
Green's assertion that recoveries were restricted to women was re-
iterated by William Prosser in three editions of his famous treatise on
118. Green, supra note 104, at 772.
119. Id. at 761.
120. This count of 40 cases includes only negligence cases in which the injury was produced
principally by fright, rather than by physical impact. In his article, Green cited 87 cases of
various types, including intentional torts, distress due to mishandled corpses, and libel. Overall,
in the cited cases there were 62 female plaintiffs and 25 male plaintiffs. Women won their suits in
37 cases (58% success rate); men won in 11 cases (44% success rate).
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torts, the first published in 1941. Prosser noted that fright-based phys-
ical injury cases so frequently involved miscarriages "that [miscar-
riage] has come to typify them." 121 By 1964, however, Prosser
described Green's assertion as "something of an overstatement" and
defensively asserted that "[a]lthough miscarriages are still plentiful,
there is also a good supply of cases of heart attacks, and the like, oc-
curring to mere males."1 22 Both Green and Prosser created the im-
pression that women not only dominated the tort but that "mere" men
might have a harder time recovering. But there is no reliable empiri-
cal data suggesting that the success rate for women was actually sub-
stantially higher in this type of case than it was for men.
Most significantly, if it is generally difficult for plaintiffs of either
gender to win fright-based injury cases, the law might be said to be
structurally biased against the class of plaintiffs who bring such suits.
The analogy here would be to the structural bias that exists in the
work force in the pay rates of men and women workers. As the com-
parable worth debate has made clear,123 a large portion of the gender
pay gap is attributable to the fact that most women wage workers are
employed in low-paying "female" jobs. Low compensation for wo-
men's jobs may appear gender neutral because the few men who work
at such jobs are also disadvantaged. The structural bias, however, de-
rives from the undervaluation of jobs dominated by women, regardless
of the equal treatment of individual workers within each job category.
For such a structural bias to exist in the law of fright-based injury, two
propositions must obtain: recovery for fright-based injuries must be
disfavored in law (as compared to other tort claims) and women must
be more likely to sue for such disfavored claims. Green and other
legal commentators of this time seemed to have assumed both proposi-
tions to be true. They did not, however, regard this structural bias as
discrimination against women.
Like other liberal intellectuals of his generation, Green was moved
by the faith that documentation of social reality was essential to un-
derstanding and to reform. Contemporary feminism shares a similiar
distrust of abstractions and a preference for the concrete. Green's
work is liberating for feminists because he was not afraid to challenge
the legal categories and to show how the law is infinitely malleable and
121. W. PROSSER, supra note 62, § 34, at 213-14 & n.55; W. PROSSER, supra note 97, § 37, at
178 & n.4 (2d ed. 1955); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 350 & n.80
(3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter W. PROSSER, TORTS].
122. W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 121, § 55, at 350 n.80.
123. For a discussion of the growing body of scholarship on comparable worth, see H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 712-18 (3d ed. 1988).
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untidy. Yet in 1933 Green did not possess a feminist's inclination to
trace the implications of his assertion about the gender of the plaintiffs
in fright cases. His realist approach remained indifferent to questions
of sexual equality.
VII. THE FREUDIAN PERSPECTIVE: DR. SMITH OPPOSES
RECOVERY, 1944
The longest and one of the most frequently cited law review arti-
cles on fright-based injury is Dr. Hubert Winston Smith's Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 124
written during World War II. The article was cited, for example, in
the 1963 opinion in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 25 the
California case that was the immediate antecedent of Dillon v. Legg. 1
2 6
Smith was also relied upon heavily in the most recent edition of
Harper, James, and Gray's well-known treatise on torts. 127 Smith was
well-credentialed in both law and medicine: he received his law de-
gree from Harvard in 1930 and his medical degree from Harvard in
1941. Commissioned a lieutenant in the Medical Corps of the Naval
Reserve, Smith spent the war years as an "Associate in Medical-Legal
Research" in Harvard's Law and Medical Schools.
128
The distinctive feature of Smith's article was his effort to offer a
review of fright-based injury cases that was informed by modem medi-
cal scholarship. Smith purported to examine 301 cases in which plain-
tiffs claimed psychic injury. His subject matter was broader than
fright-based physical injury: he included within his category of ner-
vous shock some cases in which there was no allegation of physical
injury, including the famous Lynch v. Knight slander case discussed
earlier. 129
More than any other legal commentator, Smith expressed aware-
ness of gender in his analysis of the case law of fright. His summaries
of the early cases showed that women predominated as plaintiffs and
that the injuries complained of were often sex-based, especially in that
124. 30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).' The volume also contains a companion article on traumatic
neurosis, jointly authored by Dr. Smith and Harry C. Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30
VA. L. REv. 87 (1943).
125. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 311, 379 P.2d 5i3, 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43 (1963).
126. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc); see infra notes 183-99
and accompanying text.
127. F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 13, § 18.4, at nn.1, 5, 9,12, 18, 26, 27, 36.
128. 1965 DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS IN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LAW SCHOOLS
318; see also Smith, supra note 124, at 193.
129. Smith, supra note 124, at 313 (table A20); see also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying
text (discussing Lynch v. Knight, IX H.L. Cas. 576, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861)).
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so many cases involved pregnancy and miscarriage. In summing up
the legal state of affairs in the early twentieth century, Smith recog-
nized the courts' implicit assumption "that normal persons do not suf-
fer injury from fright."'130 He did not criticize the courts for treating
women's harms as abnormal or for failing to compensate women for
recurring injuries in their lives. Rather, Smith concluded his article by
entreating the courts to refuse recovery - in the name of modem
medicine.
As a physician, Smith was interested in making the point that the
direction of modem medicine, and especially of modem psychiatry,
had established as "a scientific fact that adequate psychic stimuli can
produce a varying degree of disability in a normal person." 131 This
disability might appear immediately and with dramatic force, as in
miscarriage. But the new field of psychosomatic medicine enabled the
physician to diagnose more subtle presentations of psychic disability,
not all of which appeared overnight and some of which required "usu-
ally a long bombardment with emotional stimuli" over a period of
time. 132 Smith had in mind disorders such as asthma, angina, hyper-
tension, colitis, peptic ulcers, gastritis, anorexia nervosa, and
psoriasis. 1
33
Smith's understanding of the multiple medical consequences of
fright led him to search for a line behind which to confine legal liabil-
ity. Like his Victorian predecessors, he chose to limit recovery to
"normal" individuals - but Smith deployed Freudian-sounding argu-
ments to discredit claims of women (and some men) who did not mea-
sure up to his conception of normality. In Smith's view, normal
people generally suffered only "temporary upset or fleeting illness"
from the nervous shock produced by psychic stimuli. More serious
consequences usually meant that the plaintiff was "idiosyncratic" -
Smith's term for abnormal. Smith maintained: "The relationship of
emotional stimuli to grave physical injury and to diagnosable disease
seems to involve a weak link previously present. The mechanism of
injury here usually involves aggravation of a preexisting impairment
with the factor of individual idiosyncrasy or susceptibility playing the
dominant role."' 1
34
Smith's medicalized notions of normality disadvantaged women.
He believed that it was proper to classify pregnancy as "a temporary
130. Smith, supra note 124, at 210.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 217.
133. Id. at 217-20.
134. Id. at 225-26.
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idiosyncrasy"' 135 and that "[a]n actor should not be required to assume
that every female in his path is about to become a mother."' 136 He
asserted that the Coultas137 court was "shrewd" in denying Mary
Coultas recovery for her miscarriage because "injury through emo-
tional stimuli in civilian life is a rare result usually due to idiosyn-
crasy." 138 With regard to injuries sustained by mothers or other close
relatives who witnessed their child's death or injury, Smith character-
ized the plaintiffs' susceptibility to shock as "similar to an idiosyn-
crasy."' 39 Although Smith did not endorse a blanket rule against
recovery in all "bystander" cases, his notion of the occasions in which
defendants could fairly be held to anticipate and guard against these
"special" risks of harm was quite restricted. 14°
Beyond these paradigm cases of nervous shock, Smith also believed
that far more women than men were likely to develop traumatic neu-
roses as a result of psychic stimuli. Smith was extremely hostile to this
class of plaintiffs and claimed that a patient suffering from a traumatic
neurosis was "never as badly off as he appear[ed]."' 141 In a companion
article on traumatic neurosis, Smith theorized about the origin of trau-
matic neurosis, with sex role stereotypes at the core of his "analysis":
Males venture into places of peril as much as females and so are as fre-
quently exposed to [trivial impacts or psychic stimuli]. But the male is
usually the breadwinner; his thoughts are distracted from his experience
by the tasks of his job, and further, he has much to lose and little to gain
by developing a neurosis. The female is usually at home, has more time
to ponder upon the experience, and more to gain and less to lose from
developing symptoms. The independent post-accident psychological
forces conducing to neurosis are apt to be more potent in her case.142
Smith conjured up the image of a neurotic woman who, with the
135. Id. at 296. Smith described pregnancy in the following contradictory terms:
Pregnancy is a normal biological state for a young woman, yet miscarriage could not occur
without it. For that reason it may be proper to classify pregnancy as a temporary idiosyn-
crasy as it makes the expectant mother susceptible to an injury which the non-pregnant
woman could not sustain.
Id
136. Id. Smith added the qualification that an actor "might be put on notice by the woman's
configurations if the pregnancy is advanced, or by statistical probabilities if his conduct is di-
rected toward a crowd." Id.
137. Victorian Rys. Commrs. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
138. Smith, supra note 124, at 285.
139. Id. at 239 n.152.
140. For example, Smith stated that mothers were foreseeable victims if the child endangered
were "in his own yard or house" or were younger than seven years old. In these cases a parent
could be expected to be close by "hovering over her 'chick.'" Id.
141. Smith & Solomon, supra note 124, at 117.
142. Id. at 112.
[Vol. 88:814
Law of Fright
aid of "competent directors and producers," 143 used the legal system
as "a special stage for the enactment of a drama calculated to over-
throw jury conservatism."' 144 In the final summary to his primary arti-
cle, Smith made explicit his awareness of gender and his lack of
receptivity to the claims of plaintiffs. After asserting that his study of
301 cases "gives one a 'feeling tone' not to be had from studying a
single case,"'145 Smith presented a case count to support his view that
courts ought to be deeply skeptical of claims of fright-based injury.
He claimed that in 216 of the 301 cases the plaintiff possessed a "pre-
existing vulnerability"' 46 that should have barred recovery. Smith
thought that the courts had been altogether too lenient to plaintiffs.
His oft-quoted final assessment was that "[t]he net balance of justice in
the years 1880-1944 would have been greater had redress been denied
in all cases of alleged injury from psychic stimuli.
'147
Smith was the first commentator to quantify the extent to which
psychic injury claims were dominated by female plaintiffs. He found
that the ratio of female plaintiffs to male among his 301 cases was a
striking 5:1.148 His analysis of this gender disparity combined an odd
mixture of conservative imagery and sociological speculation. Smith
asked, "Is the fairer sex also the frailer in its resistance to psychic
stimuli?"'149 He suggested that pregnant women might be more sensi-
tive to stimuli and offered the "comparative conditioning of the two
sexes to environmental stress and to psychological factors"1 50 as an
explanation of why fright causes sickness more often in women than in
men. Smith even ventured to explain why women sue more often in
impact cases: "We might theorize that more women than men suffer
'injury from without,' either because they frighten more easily or in
fleeing from apprehended peril, are handicapped by lack of athletic
prowess or masculine agility and so fall victim to comparative
clumsiness."151
143. Id. at 118.
144. Id. at 115.
145. Smith, supra note 124, at 278.
146. Id. at 282.
147. Id. at 303. Earlier in the article, Smith had added 30 years to his assertion about the
"net balance of justice," covering the period from 1850 to 1944. Id. at 285.
148. Id. at 280. We were unable to verify the accuracy of Smith's ratio. Smith's two appen-
dices of cases contain 565 entries. There are, however, some cases listed more than one time and
some cases in which the parties plaintiff included both a man and a woman. Our recount of
Smith's cases reveals only 281 distinct cases, with 57 male plaintiffs and 224 female plaintiffs. By
this count, there is only a 4:1 female-male ratio. This count also reveals 54 miscarriage cases,






Smith's final speculation is somewhat more plausible. He sug-
gested that the gender disparity among plaintiffs in psychic injury
cases might reflect prevailing sex-role stereotypes more than actual
events:
[I]t may be that in cases of alleged injury through psychic stimuli, attor-
neys encourage suit if they have a lady litigant and discourage it if the
claimant be a male.... It well may be that the male ego is too compro-
mised by claiming injury through fright, this deterrent to suit being bol-
stered by social taboos. After all, one has to face a jury, and he does not
like to become an ass before his fellow man. A woman's "femininity" is
not hurt by such a claim. A certain amount of fragility is expected and
esteemed. 152
To bolster his argument that fright rarely caused physical injury to
average or normal persons, Smith drew an analogy between nervous
shock in civilian life and combat neuroses. Drawing on what was un-
derstood in the mid-years of World War II about combat stress, Smith
wrote that "there is reason to think that many soldiers who suffer ma-
jor psychiatric crack-up, such as neurosis or psychosis[,] came up to
these gruelling experiences possessed of subnormal resistance." 1
5 3
Skeptical of both the claims of women in fright cases and of men who
claimed combat neurosis, Smith saw the situations as analogous be-
cause he believed that, in both settings, the victim stood to gain by
pleading weakness - a situation otherwise uncommon.
Smith's turn to the combat analogy was not farfetched. In
premodern societies, people often assumed a rough congruence be-
tween the physical risk to which men were put in battle and the physi-
cal pain and risk that women experienced in childbirth.15 4 Moreover,
the concept of combat stress was in Smith's day intensely discussed by
military physicians who were under considerable pressure to find ways
to distinguish authentic cases from malingering, that is, simple
fright. 155 Smith himself was hostile to all claims based on fright; they
152. Id.
153. Id at 286.
154. Huston, The Matrix of War: Mothers and Heroes, in THE FEMALE BODY IN WESTERN
CULTURE 119, 127 (S. Suleiman ed. 1986).
155. The official history of The Army Air Forces in World War II, for example, compiled by
the Air Force Historical Division in 1958, dismissed consultations from psychologists and psy-
chiatrists as often adding "to the confusion," 7 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE HISTORICAL DIvI-
SION, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II 416 (1958), and comfortably asserted:
"Twelve years after the end of the war one fails to see the grave psychic consequences of pushing
men to - and beyond - what many then considered the breaking point." Id. at 404.
During World War II, psychiatrists in both England and the United States tended to assume
that "combat neurosis" or "war neurosis" was not a distinctive condition. As W. Ronald D.
Fairbairn asserted in the British Medical Journal in 1943, "so far as symptomatology is con-
cerned, the war neuroses possess no distinctive features differentiating them sharply from the
various psychoneurotic and psychotic states which prevail in time of peace." Fairbairn, The War
Neuroses: Their Nature and Significance, BRIT. MED. J., Feb. 13, 1943, at 183. Fairbairn ended
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were due, he concluded, to the preexisting personal weaknesses of the
victims and not to the aggressive acts of the "prime movers,"
156
whether the latter was a private citizen driving a car negligently or the
state in the act of conducting a war.
157
Overall, there is a vicious circularity to Smith's central argument.
The abnormality of fright-based physical harm is proven by the idio-
syncratic nature of the person experiencing the harm. But Smith's
characterization of both the harm and the plaintiff is premised on a
male-oriented - at times misogynist - standard of the "normal" per-
son.158 Smith's application of Freud to legal doctrine prompted him
to notice gender but in the process to reinforce gender inequality. His
argument faults women for not conforming to his stereotype of com-
bat-ready men.
VIII. FROM BYSTANDER TO MOTHER: THE Amaya and Dillon
Cases, 1962-1968
1. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.
The breakthrough case that first permitted recovery for mothers
who witnessed their children's injury was a California appellate deci-
sion written by Justice Matthew 0. Tobriner in 1962. At the time
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 159 was decided, the courts
seemed to be hardening their stance against recovery in "bystander"
by denying the existence of combat neurosis completely. What was being seen, he argued, was
regression to an infantile state and a symptom of separation anxiety. He concluded, "I remain
convinced that... the problem presented by the war neuroses is not one of psychotherapy but
one of morale." Id. at 186. In arguing for predisposition, Smith reflected the opinions of mili-
tary psychiatrists of his generation. See Gowan, Psychiatric Aspects of Military Disabilities, 41
U.S. NAVAL MED. BULL. 129 (1943); Schwab, Feinsinger, & Brazier, Psychoneuroses Precipi-
tated by Combat, 42 U.S. NAVAL MED. BULL. 535 (1944).
156. In this and other articles, Smith often referred to the defendant as the "prime mover."
See, eg., Smith, supra note 124, at 229 n.128 (arguing against liability for negligent infliction of
mental distress without accompanying physical injury because "the prime mover in society
would be unduly penalized and prevalent neurotic patterns inthe populace encouraged"); id. at
269. As late as 1963, Smith expressed his concern that a "neurotic personality" would be given
"tremendous damages" as a result of "minimal traumatic experience suffered at the hands of a
wholesome prime mover, seeking to advance social interests by exercising Yankee ingenuity and
industry." Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 586, 624
(1963).
157. What Smith did not observe, however, is that soldiers, like many women, find them-
selves in structural situations in which they are denied autonomy and choice. See C. SMITH-
ROSENBERG, supra note 31, at 331 n.5.
158. In the one instance in which Smith theorizes about the standard for determining "what
sort of neighbor" defendants must take care to protect, he uses exclusively male examples:
"Shall it be the sturdy phlegmatic chap who has been building up his biceps at the Y.M.C.A., the
fragile fellow whose resistance is subnormal, or the average man in normal health, toughened and
seasoned by everyday stimuli of the knock-about world?" Smith, supra note 124, at 254-55.




cases, except in the rare "danger zone" situation in which the plaintiff
was also physically imperiled. 16° The most prominent advocate for
extending recovery to mothers and other witnesses - William Prosser
- had reluctantly admitted in his role as Reporter to the Second Re-
statement of Torts that the most recent case law was decidedly against
plaintiffs. The drafters of the Second Restatement went on record in
1960 as embracing a definite rule against liability in bystander cases. 61
The courts' reluctance to award parents damages for shock at wit-
nessing the death or injury of their child, however, was in tension with
an increasing willingness on the part of the insurance industry and the
courts in other contexts to place a monetary value on children's lives
and to commodify the parent- child relationship.162 The seeming para-
dox of "pricing the priceless child"'163 had already been transcended in
the more typical suits for wrongful death of a child where the parent
did not actually witness the injury.16 Until Amaya, however, the
courts had resisted taking the further step of permitting recovery for
fright-based harm suffered by parents present at the scene of the
accident.
Amaya had all the ingredients of the paradigm fright-based injury
case. Lillian Amaya watched from a distance of eighty feet as her
seventeen-month-old son was crushed beneath the wheels of a negli-
gently driven ice truck in the driveway of their home.1 65 Lillian
160. See W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 121, at 352-53.
161. In a note to the Institute, Prosser explained the decision to add a new subsection deny-
ing recovery in "bystander" cases. This was more restrictive than the First Restatement, which
had included a "caveat" withholding opinion on the rights of parents or spouses who witnessed
the peril or harm of their children or spouse. Prosser wrote:
The Caveat is stricken - and Subsection (2) is substituted, because of the overwhelming
weight of the case law. The Advisers were unanimous in wishing to retain the Caveat, for its
possible effect upon the courts - although it must be conceded that it has thus far had no
effect. The Reporter is in sympathy with this position, and feels that there should be liabil-
ity to a mother who suffers a heart attack when she sees her child killed before her eyes. He
is compelled, however, to recognize that the decisions are otherwise. The Council are
agreed that the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313, at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1960).
162. By 1895, there was a large market for insuring children's lives, Supporters of the insur-
ance industry defended the business as a symbolic means of demonstrating parental love. V.
ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 115, 127 (1985).
163. See id. Zelizer developed the theory that the increased commercialization of children
paradoxically was supported by an ideology that viewed children as the sentimental, priceless
assets of their parents, particularly their mothers. Zelizer considered these developments as in-
fusing money with a symbolic meaning and simultaneously permitting an economic valuation of
non-economic injuries. Id. at 159-60, 211-12.
164. See id., at 147-60; see also Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 728, 475
A.2d 19, 23 (1984) (35 jurisdictions allow for loss of companionship to parents in wrongful death
actions); Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
165. See Recent Developments, 15 STAN. L. REv. 740, 744 n.13 (1963) (citing letter from
plaintiff's counsel, James Oppen (Oct. 16, 1962)).
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Amaya was seven months pregnant at the time of the accident and
claimed that the trauma of the event produced physical shock and
other bodily injuries. 166 She refused the opportunity to amend her
complaint to allege that she also feared for her own physical safety and
insisted that her only fear was for the safety of her child.167
Justice Matthew Tobriner had a well-established reputation as a
jurist of great distinction and intellectual force. Educated at Stanford
and Harvard, he had spent his early career as a lawyer for labor un-
ions and agricultural cooperatives in the 1930s and 1940s. After sev-
eral decades in private practice, Tobriner was appointed to the
California Court of Appeals in 1959.168 Amaya was one of the last
opinions he wrote there; later in 1962 he was appointed to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court.169
Justice Tobriner's ruling for the intermediate appellate court in
favor of Amaya was self-consciously reformist. Although he at-
tempted to discount the significance of some of the adverse precedents,
Tobriner's basic strategy was to declare that the prevailing view was
fundamentally unjust and simply "not consonant with the reactions,
or the mores, of the society of today." 170 In this first round of the
debate in the California courts on bystander recovery, Tobriner did
not elaborate on the contemporary conditions that compelled the con-
clusion that mothers who witnessed the negligent injuring of their chil-
dren deserved compensation. He made only a passing reference to the
"teachings of psychiatry" to undercut the familiar argument that emo-
tional disturbance is too hard to measure or too easy to fake. 171 For
the most part, Tobriner's public policy argument for recovery in
Amaya was unstated. He proceeded from the assumption that it was
"obvious" 172 that a denial of recovery to mothers is unfair, and sought
to expose contrary legal precedent as "anachronistic" 173 without stat-
166. Amaya, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 132. A student commentator has asserted that the only injuries
Lillian Amaya sustained were recurring nightmares. Recent Developments, supra note 165, at
740 n. 1 (citing letter from plaintiff's counsel, James Oppen (Oct. 16, 1962)).
167. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 133. We do not know why Lillian Amaya made this potentially damag-
ing concession. Perhaps because she was located so far from the accident scene she could not
credibly claim fear for her own personal safety. It is also possible that her refusal to amend
reflected her own experience of the trauma and that she refused to misrepresent her experience or
accede to a legal system that denied recovery for this relationally oriented harm.
168. See generally Grodin, Justice Tobriner Portrait of the Judge as an Artist, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 7 (1977).
169. Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J.
294 (1972)
170. Amaya, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
171. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
172. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 97, at 181).
173. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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ing exactly what had changed.
Tobriner's ruling for the plaintiff in Amaya was reversed by the
California Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision. 174 In fact, the result was
even closer than the split indicated. By the time of the supreme court
ruling, Justice Tobriner had himself been elevated to the supreme
court. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, Tobriner was required
to recuse himself from the Amaya litigation in the supreme court be-
cause he had decided the case in the lower court. The judge sitting in
for Tobriner supplied the critical vote against the plaintiff to produce
the very shakiest of precedents against recovery. 175
The supreme court's majority opinion in Amaya relied heavily on
the scholarship of both Leon Green and Hubert Winston Smith to
justify its refusal to recognize a cause of action. The court used
Green's work 7 6 to support its claim that it was the function of the
court, not the jury, to declare a rule of nonliability based upon its
weighing of the various administrative, socio-economic, and moral fac-
tors present in this type of case.177 The court thus turned Green's
realist identification of the operational factors at work in cases already
decided into a conservative argument in favor of the status quo. The
majority avoided defending the logic of the restrictive rule by borrow-
ing Green's realist balancing of societal interests.
From Smith's article, 178 the majority drew support for its skeptical
appraisal of the medical reality underlying the claims for fright-based
injuries. The court endorsed Smith's view that justice would be better
served by denying recovery altogether in this type of case.179 The
court accepted as fact Smith's assertion that most of the plaintiffs
claiming injury in fright-based physical harm cases possessed subnor-
mal resistance to fright and did not deserve to recover. 180
By using the term "spectator injury"1 81 to describe Lillian
174. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (en bane).
175. Justice White, pro tern, concurred while sitting in for Justice Tobriner in Amaya. 59
Cal. 2d at 332, 379 P.2d at 536, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
176. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928).
177. 59 Cal. 2d at 308-15, 379 P.2d at 521-25, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41-45.
178. Smith, supra note 124. For a discussion of this article, see supra notes 124-58 and
accompanying text.
179. 59 Cal. 2d at 311, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43; see also supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
180. "Much timeliness remains in Dr. Smith's warning... that 'eagerness to be progressive
may cause extravagant credulity and injury to scientific standards of proof.' Extravagant credu-
lity, of course, means ultimate injustice." 59 Cal. App. 2d at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr.
at 43.
181. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 514, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
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Amaya's harm, the majority cast her injuries in an unsympathetic
light. Like the term "bystander," the "spectator" image likens a
mother's injury to the emotional response of any witness and places no
special weight on her relationship to her child. This aspect of the ma-
jority opinion infuriated dissenting Justice Raymond E. Peters. Pe-
ters' opinion emphasized that "[t]he plaintiff here is not just anyone.
She is a mother of a 17-month-old infant child.'1 8 2 The split in the
court in Amaya was between the majority's view of the plaintiff as a
bystander and the dissent's focus on the plaintiff as a mother.
2. Dillon v. Legg
Only five years after deciding Amaya, the California Supreme
Court overruled it in Dillon v. Legg. 18 3 Justice Tobriner wrote for the
new majority in 1968. He stressed that the plaintiff was a mother, not
an ordinary bystander, who witnessed the negligent killing of her
child. For Tobriner, this type of case was "the most egregious case of
them all: the mother's emotional trauma at the witnessed death of her
child."
1 8 4
The facts of Dillon closely resembled Amaya. On September 27,
1964, Margery Dillon was sitting on the porch of her home in Sacra-
mento watching her four-year-old daughter Erin cross the street. At
the time of the accident, Erin's older sister Cheryl was also on the curb
nearby. Both Margery Dillon and Cheryl saw Erin struck and killed
by a car negligently driven by David Legg. Margery Dillon's com-
plaint alleged that she suffered both physical and emotional injuries
from witnessing the death of her child.
1 85
The only arguably relevant factual distinction between Amaya and
Dillon was that, in the latter case, Cheryl, but not her mother, was in
the "danger zone" - Cheryl was located sufficiently near the accident
to have feared for her own safety, as well as the safety of her sister.
Under prevailing, precedent that allowed recovery only to witnesses
who were within the danger zone, Cheryl stood a chance of recovering
for her fright-based trauma while her mother did not.1
86
182. 59 Cal. 2d at 316, 379 P.2d at 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Peters, . dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
183. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (en banc).
184. 68 Cal. 2d at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
185. Dillon v. Legg, Complaint at 4.
186. Cheryl Dillon's claim survived pretrial dismissal because there was a possibility that she
was in the zone of danger at the time of the accident. 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 75. Because Margery Dillon was clearly outside the danger zone, her claim was dis-
missed on the pleadings based on the Amaya precedent. 68 Cal. 2d at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69
Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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Tobriner would not allow the ruling in Dillon to depend on this
narrow factual distinction. Instead he flatly rejected the danger zone
approach as a "hopeless artificiality"'' 1 7 that would produce the anom-
alous result of granting "relief to the sister.., and yet deny it to the
mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was some few
yards closer to the accident."1881 The new rule announced in Dillon
was that liability would depend on the more flexible test of whether
the accident and the harm were reasonably foreseeable.18 9 Tobriner
expressly noted that the closeness of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the victim should be a key determinant of foreseeabil-
ity. 190 The old physical danger zone was transformed by Tobriner into
a larger zone of emotional danger.
In Dillon, Tobriner made it clear that he was an unapologetic judi-
cial activist, shaping the law to accommodate social change. But it
was clear also that his was a cautious activism, that his vision of ap-
propriate change emerged from a long historical perspective and from
a liberal's skepticism of letting traditional categories get in the way of
equitable solutions. It was "indefensible orthodoxy" that Tobriner
opposed.191
187. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
188. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
189. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
190. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The Court struggled, however,
with the problem of precisely which relationships would qualify as close enough for recovery. At
one point, the issue was brought close to home by Justices Peters and Traynor, who wondered
aloud whether "grandpas" could recover under the new standard. Record at 3.
191. 68 Cal. 2d at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85. Later in his career, Tobriner
would energetically defend judicial activism. He wrote:
[L]aw, as an instrument of social control, must, by necessity, respond to the emerging pres-
sures for change within our society, and, if the legal system is to remain viable in the face of
today's rapidly shifting mores, we acutely need the advocates of change.... In recent years
the judicial system has proven itself capable of grasping the significant movements that have
changed the complexion of our culture, and of shaping legal relationships to accommodate
new social patterns and to preserve cherished freedoms.
Tobriner, supra note 169, at 296-98.
Tobriner was an advocate for ending discrimination against gays and lesbians, racial minori-
ties, and women. See Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595
P.2d 592 (1979) (public utilities could not engage in employment discrimination against homo-
sexuals). Tobriner's career would culminate in his two most famous opinions, his opinion for the
majority in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), and his
dissent in Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1976), modified, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Marvin, popularly known as the "palimony" case, the
new social pattern that Tobriner was willing to accommodate was nonmarital cohabitation.
"[W]e believe," he wrote, "that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modem society and
the social acceptance of them" is a matter which courts should acknowledge; the "nonmarital
relationship of today" was not the equivalent of the "meretricious relationship" that the law had
traditionally understood to be prostitution. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
838. In Bakke, the social change Tobriner wished to support was the integration of black stu-
dents into medical schools. His dissent remains an eloquent defense of affirmative action as
entirely consistent with the goals of the fourteenth amendment.
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Dillon set a new legal course based on what Tobriner described as
the "natural justice" of the mother's claim.192 "Dillon is unique," To-
briner asserted in a reflective essay two years after the decision, "in its
emphasis upon the rights of the victim as opposed to a historical con-
cern with the violation of a duty of due care." 193 As he worked out his
justification for extending the rights of the victim and the scope of the
defendant's responsibilities, Tobriner envisioned the victim not simply
as Margery Dillon the person, but as Margery Dillon the mother,
whose presence on the scene of the accident was inextricably linked to
her role as parent. 194 The view of the world embedded in Tobriner's
opinion is one in which fathers go to work and mothers care for their
children, a world in which children are central to their mothers' emo-
tional lives. 195 Tobriner was only narrowly reversed on appeal in
Amaya; his decision there is not very different from the one that
"stuck" in Dillon. As a liberal judge writing in the 1960s, he was al-
ready deeply committed to expanding the rights of those who exper-
ienced loss, and he was willing to open up the categories of legal harm
and duty.
Tobriner was conscious of and made use of the gender of the plain-
tiff in his opinion in Dillon. Much of Tobriner's opinion is written in
gender-specific language (mother, rather than parent) although he ulti-
mately articulated the criteria for recovery in future cases in gender-
neutral terms. 196 Tobriner deployed the gender of the plaintiff both to
guarantee the genuineness of the injury suffered and to argue for the
foreseeability of the injury. His use of gender and maternity, however,
was not woven explicitly into his legal rationale for a new doctrine.
For example, Tobriner did not explain why it took until 1968 to recog-
nize this obviously just claim for maternal injury. He pointed to no
specific changed social circumstances, beyond an oblique reference to
"modern medical knowledge" 197 as support for treating fright on a par
with physical impact. He drew no connection between the "indefen-
192. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
193. Tobriner, The Changing Concepts of Duty in the Law of Torts, 9 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.
17, 19 (1970) (emphasis in original).
194. Record at 25, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1968) (en
bane).
195. This world view permeated the oral argument. For example, Archie Hefner, Dillon's
attorney, repeatedly stressed that mothers would naturally be at their children's side: "[I]f you
and I were there, and we saw children, we would certainly anticipate on a given day of the week
that their mothers certainly would not be very far away." Record at 8.
196. The cause of action was not limited explicitly to mothers; the courts were asked only to
consider the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and the victim in deciding the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's response. See supra note 25.
197. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 n.5, 441 P.2d 912, 920 n.5 (1968).
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sible orthodoxy"1 98 underlying the more restrictive doctrines and soci-
etal bias against women. Nor did the fact that Margery Dillon was a
divorced parent of limited financial resources1 99 who may have had a
particularly compelling need for legal recognition of her interests find
its way into his opinion.
IX. REDISCOVERING DILLoN" A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE, 1990
Neither Margery Dillon nor her lawyers, so far as we can tell, un-
derstood their victory in terms of women's rights. It is also unlikely
that the judges who dissented in Amaya 200 or joined the majority in
Dillon understood themselves to be responding directly to the
gendered nature of the issues in these cases. Subsequent legal com-
mentators have also ignored the role that gender played in Dillon.
20'
The recognition of the cause of action in Dillon, however, has an
ideological dimension that, like the fright precedents before it, is tied
to gender. Dillon should also be mined for what it can tell us about
cultural attitudes in the 1960s, especially about the relationships be-
tween women and their children and how those relationships bear on
the physical well-being of women. Timing is crucial. "Mother love"
surely was not a creation of America in the 1960s. Why then did it
take so long for the courts to produce Dillon?
198. 68 Cal. 2d at 748, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
199. Dillon's attorney did, however, alert the California Supreme Court to these personal
facts about his client. At oral argument he first described Margery Dillon as divorced, although
he quickly added that that fact was not material to the case. Record at 1. At another point, he
described Margery Dillon's residence as a "small house," giving the impression that she was not
well off financially. Record at 8. It appears that Margery Dillon supported her children without
help from her ex-husband. In her wrongful death complaint, Dillon alleged that her ex-husband
had not contributed materially to Erin's support and maintenance before her death. Complaint
at % II.
200. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (en banc).
201. Several commentators have been critical of the "liberal" Dillon holding because of their
concern with limiting costs for defendants and lessening the strain on the courts. See, e.g., Dia-
mond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Rela-
tives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984); Henderson, Expanding the Negligence
Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Miller, The Scope of Liability
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," I U.
HAW. L. REv. 1 (1979); Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm -- A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. RaV. 477 (1982).
Guido Calabresi is one of the few commentators who goes beyond cost-benefit assessments to
acknowledge tort law's role in "shaping tastes." Calabresi claims that the law is more likely to
compensate for an emotional cost when the harm is intuitively "shocking, offensive, and even
abominable." G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW 83-84 (1985). He
makes sense of Dillon by reading the case as an indicator that society does not want people to
become callous about seeing their children or spouses killed, whereas society might be better off if
nonrelated individuals (Le., true bystanders) were encouraged to shrug off the emotional impact
of seeing another person injured or killed. Id.
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It is a truism that court decisions swim like fish in a sea of ideol-
ogy. "[W]e can never," Benjamin Cardozo wrote long ago, "see...
with any eyes except our own."' 20 2 The years between 1960, when an
ice truck injured James Amaya, and 1968, when Tobriner handed
down the California Supreme Court's decision in Dillon, were transi-
tional years in American social history. They marked the end stages
of an era that we remember as "the cold war," a period usually dated
from 1945 to 1965 or so, in which an overarching demand for security
in foreign affairs filtered into a "domestic revival" that offered mar-
riage and motherhood as the only appropriate roles for women.
20 3
"The cold war consensus and the pervasive atmosphere of anti-
communism made personal experimentation, as well as political resist-
ance, risky endeavors with dim prospects for significant positive
results," writes historian Elaine Tyler May.a 4 In this atmosphere,
"[p]rocreation . . . took on almost mythic proportions.
[P]arenthood [was] the key not only to responsible citizenship and a
secure future but to a personally fulfilling life.... Along with the baby
boom came an intense and widespread endorsement of pronatalism -
the belief in the positive value of having several children. '205 The
family, particularly the mother, became a symbol of stability and
security.
This ideology was sustained despite the fact that mothers increas-
ingly worked outside the home; in 1960, forty percent of women over
sixteen held a job, and one-third of working women were mothers of
children under eighteen.20 6 In the face of changing economic reality,
many elements in American society sought to dissuade mothers from
thinking of themselves as independent from their children and thus to
preserve the cult of domesticity. In newspaper accounts, even women
of substantial professional accomplishment "were carefully described
as mothers first."'20 7 In a social context in which women's identities
were understood to be motherly and domestic, even women's political
action had to find a domestic language in which to express itself. As
Amy Swerdlow's study of Women Strike for Peace has shown, when
thousands of women wanted to protest atomic bomb testing in 1961,
they found that the most effective strategy - indeed, the only effective
202. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).
203. This social and ideological development has recently received insightful historical analy-
sis in E. MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA (1988).
204. Id. at 207.
205. Id. at 135-37.
206. W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, at 218 (1972).
207. E. KALEDIN, MOTHERS AND MORE: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1950s 65 (1984).
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strategy - available to them was to organize as mothers who feared
for the health of their children and who worried particularly about
strontium-90 in milk. Any other stance was vulnerable to being at-
tacked as unwomanly, un-American, and pro-Communist.
208
The valuing of children and the privileging of the maternal rela-
tionship that pervaded the domestic ideology of the cold war period
might well have reinforced Lillian Amaya's and Margery Dillon's
sense that they personally had been wronged by harms to their chil-
dren and strengthened their decisions to seek compensation for their
own suffering. Clearly the lawyers for Amaya and Dillon emphasized
the special "maternal" nature of the injuries their clients suffered. Lil-
lian Amaya's complaint, for example, underscored her role as mother
and mother-to-be: she alleged that at the time of the accident, she was
"in a state of pregnancy that had advanced to approximately seven
months; that the natural maternal bonds of affection existed between
plaintiff and her infant son."' 209 At the oral argument before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, Margery Dillon's lawyer spoke of the "tradi-
tional classic concept of motherhood.., which we all admire and look
up to."' 210 It was thus in their roles as mothers that Lillian Amaya and
Margery Dillon came before the courts.
The Dillon cause of action signifies that the law regards a mother's
anguish at witnessing the death or injury of her child as a harm that
qualifies for legal protection. This recognition of the claims of
mothers was congruent with the deeply domestic political ideology of
cold war society.
The Dillon opinion was also congruent with a traditional view of
women as the normal caretakers of their young children. The court
refuted the defendant's contention that a mother/witness was an un-
foreseeable plaintiff in child pedestrian cases by stating what it thought
to be the obvious: mothers were often likely to be found in the vicinity
of their young children. 211 The opinion also revealed a sentimental
view of maternity. In criticizing the requirement that recovery must
be predicated on the plaintiff's fear for her own personal safety, Tobri-
ner commented on the example in the Hambrook212 case of the selfish
208. Women Strike for Peace was a loosely organized coalition of women based in Parent-
Teacher Associations, Leagues of Women Voters, church and temple groups, and established
peace organizations. See Swerdlow, Ladies Day at the Capitol. Women Strike for Peace versus
HUAC, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 493 (1982).
209. Complaint at 111, Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (en banc).
210. Record at 9, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
211. 68 Cal. 2d at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
212. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., I K.B. 141 (1925).
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mother who fears only for her own safety and the selfless mother who
cares only for the safety of her child.213 Tobriner thought that it
would be "incongruous and somewhat revolting" to let the selfish
mother recover and deny recovery to the selfless mother.214 The nor-
mative judgment that mothers should place the well-being of their
children ahead of their own comes out clearly. The image of the
"good mother" emerges; it is the good mother who is afforded legal
relief.2
15
It is also clear that the Dillon judges were writing in the intensely
political year 1968, toward the end of a decade in which both the civil
rights and anti-war movements had been conducting a national teach-
in, as it were, on the topic "the personal is political." The Presidential
Commission on the Status of Women, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt,
had been established in 1961. Betty Friedan's manifesto The Feminine
Mystique had been published in 1963, one year after the Amaya deci-
sion was handed down. When Dillon was decided, a two-year-old Na-
tional Organization of Women had articulated a call for an equal
rights amendment, for access to safe, legal abortions, and for the en-
forcement of antidiscrimination legislation. In 1968, feminists pick-
eted the Miss America pageant. 216 If the rhetoric of the Dillon
opinion looks back to the privileging of motherhood and the superfi-
cial separation of spheres that characterized the 1950s, the result in
Dillon is also congruent with the feminist movement as it would grow
in the five years following 1968, culminating in the Roe v. Wade217
decision of 1973. Despite the sentimentality for motherhood it encom-
passed, Dillon pushed against the marginalization of recurring injuries
in the lives of women and gave women a claim of legal right. A deci-
sion that had the concrete effect of putting money into the hands of
women through the redistributive mechanism of tort liability may be
understood to serve women's interests.
From this perspective, Dillon deserves to be placed with other
rights-affirming precedents of the last two decades that have been par-
213. Record at 25, Dillon; this example from Hambrook is set forth supra at note 102 and
accompanying text.
214. 68 Cal. 2d at 738 n.4, 441 P.2d at 918-19 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79 n.4.
215. Nancy Pottishman Weiss has traced shifting child care advice from the Progressive re-
formers' concern for sensible mothering practice to the permissive, child-centered advice of Ben-
jamin Spock. Weiss, Mother, the Invention of Necessity: Dr. Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child
Care, 29 AM. Q. 519 (1977). For a discussion of how the law favors the "good mother" in both
reality and fiction, see Sanger, Seasoned to the Use (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REv. 1338
(1989).
216. See De Hart-Mathews, The New Feminism and the Dynamics of Social Change, in Wo-
MEN'S AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PASr 446 (L. Kerber & J. De Hart-Mathews 2d ed. 1987).
217. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ticularly important to women. The most familiar of these legal devel-
opments are changes in public law, particularly expansion of the
constitutional notion of equality that has been employed since 1971 to
restrict explicit sex-based discrimination. 21 8 Tort law has also been
part of this movement. For example, the first recognition of a cause of
action in tort for "wrongful birth" came in 1967,219 a year before Dil-
lon was decided. This claim allows women to hold their obstetricians
accountable for unwanted pregnancies that were caused in part by the
physician's negligent treatment or diagnosis. The wrongful birth
cause of action complements the Dillon claim in that it gives legal rec-
ognition to the interest women have in their relationship to their un-
born children. The wrongful birth cause of action pressures health
professionals to make sure that a pregnant woman (or a woman con-
templating pregnancy) is advised of any condition that might affect
her own well-being or that of her unborn child. By enlarging the phy-
sician's duty, this cause of action tends to expand the notion of wo-
men's health to include reproductive health and health of offspring.
This account of Dillon also tends to validate women's expanded
role outside the domestic sphere. The legal/market valuation placed
on women's fright-based injury has the effect of mainstreaming the
injury. Dillon's willingness to protect pregnancy and maternal inter-
ests outside the narrow confines of the home contrasts with the Victo-
rian view that these activities had their proper site inside the home.
As the fright-based injury is deprivatized, the law regards it as less
unusual, less remote, and more deserving of protection. The "reason-
able man" of tort law is redefined to encompass the mother. When a
mother's fear for her child is acknowledged as a cause of her own
physical harm, we can glimpse the beginnings of a feminization of tort
law. Relational interests become a constituent feature of one's own
physical integrity. This expanded notion of physical harm resonates in
women's experience: in the physical and social experience of preg-
nancy and in the socially constructed experience of motherhood.
Gender has played a complicated role in the evolution of the law of
fright-based injury. When gender was ignored - as in assimilating
the claims of mothers to bystanders - the law minimized the harm.
218. The critical precedent is Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the first case to declare a
state law unconstitutional on grounds of sex discrimination. The constitutional developments
are canvassed in H. KAY, supra note 123, at 13-185.
219. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). For a discussion of
the tort of wrongful birth, see Bernier, Mothers as Plaintiffs in Prenatal Tort Liability Cases:
Recovery for Physical and Emotional Damages, 4 -ARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 43 (1981).
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Historically, taking account of gender has also been problematic.
Those judges and commentators who noticed gender often failed to
appreciate that their use of gender disadvantaged women. Fright-
based injuries suffered by women were "remote" to Victorian-era
judges; Leon Green, the realist, did not realize that the marginaliza-
tion of the claim for emotional harm also disproportionately harmed
women;220 Dr. H.W. Smith viewed women's fright claims as idiosyn-
cratic and unreasonable.
221
That recognizing difference may lead to marginalization, while ig-
noring difference may lead to inequitable results, has long been the
Scylla and Charybdis of feminist theory. A major goal of feminist the-
ory is to find a route past these monsters:222 first, by being skeptical of
conceptual dualisms enshrined in familiar cultural and legal practice,
and second, by unmasking claims of difference to reveal unstated
norms against which difference is judged. Dualisms are by their na-
ture restrictive. Indeed, the history of women has been confined by
dualisms - home versus market, household versus state - as has the
history of the relationship between men and women - public versus
private, culture versus nature, defender versus protected. These dual-
isms have traditionally been expressed in the language of "separate
spheres," a series of metaphors that impose dichotomy on understand-
ings of relationships and interactions. To speak of "women's culture"
and "men's culture" or, as de Tocqueville did, "two clearly distinct
lines of action" 223 for the two sexes is to leave unexamined the interre-
lationship of the activities included in each collective noun, construct-
ing a vague and unspecified array of allegedly fundamental differences
between women and men. Men and women have been enmeshed in a
system of meaning and law that, while aiming at equity, discounted
and failed to recognize claims associated with women and their inter-
ests. To be locked into a series of dualisms that pose men against wo-
men and equality against difference inhibits our ability to establish
context and to perceive hidden relationships of dominance and
subordination.224
220. See supra Part VI.
221. See supra Part VII.
222. For discussions of possible ways out of this double bind, see Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REv. 10 (1987); Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Post-Structuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINmT STUD. 33 (1988); see also Williams, Decon-
structing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
223. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 212 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
224. See Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Wo-
men's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 37-39 (1988).
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In tort law, the dualism of physical and emotional harm has ob-
scured how courts and commentators used injuries associated with
men as the dominant standard for determining legal value. This
privileging had the effect of devaluing injuries associated with women,
albeit expressed differently in different historical periods. The inequity
of the doctrines comprising the law of fright not surprisingly reflected
and reinforced inequities present in the larger social and cultural set-
tings. Tort law began to respond to women's interests at a transitional
moment in which the cold war's reification of domesticity began to
give way to the contemporary women's movement for social change.
The marginalization of the harm suffered by women in the law of
fright is not unique. This account of tort law complements scholar-
ship that focuses on other systematic biases in the law, particularly
those of race or class. Increasingly, legal scholars have chosen to ex-
amine a host of seemingly neutral tort doctrines in search of latent
systematic biases against less privileged groups.225 In constructing a
gendered history of the law of fright, we have attempted to illustrate
some important conceptual and linguistic mechanisms that have been
used at different times to marginalize women's suffering.
Dillon is important for its part in opening up the legal category of
emotional harm. In its contemporary degendered form, the Dillon
cause of action not only allows both mothers and fathers to recover for
fright, but shakes the general categories of fright and emotions from
their confined gendered origins. Women have been hurt by the classi-
fication of their fright-based physical harm as emotional disturbance.
The privileging of tangible interests over intangible interests reflects
the disparate power of those with property, not simply the differing
nature of the interests at stake. Emotional harm has been distorted by
gendering it female.
225. Richard Abel's work is important here for his emphasis on class bias in tort doctrine.
See, eg., Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 79 (1986); Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 185 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Regina Aus-
tin's analysis of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress examines interlocking systems
of race, gender, and class bias. Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1988); see also Delgado, Words
that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 133 (1982). Jean Love summarizes developments in feminist torts scholarship in Love,
Bringing Gender into the Torts Course, AALS Newsletter, Torts-Compensation Systems, at 4-8
(1989).
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